Re: [refpolicy] map permission in can_exec() but not in domain_transition_pattern()

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On Thu, Jul 19, 2018 at 07:42:53PM +0200, Lukas Vrabec via refpolicy wrote:
> On 07/19/2018 06:51 PM, Dominick Grift via refpolicy wrote:
> > On Thu, Jul 19, 2018 at 06:40:25PM +0200, Dominick Grift wrote:
> >> On Thu, Jul 19, 2018 at 06:17:46PM +0200, Lukas Vrabec via refpolicy wrote:
> >>> Hi All,
> >>>
> >>> I found one thing in refpolicy which I don't completely understand.
> >>>
> >>> In "policy/support/misc_patterns.spt" there is definition of
> >>> "domain_transition_pattern" and this contains line:
> >>> allow $1 $2:file { getattr open read execute };
> >>>
> >>> There is missing map permission.
> >>>
> >>> However in "policy/support/misc_macros.spt" there is definition of
> >>> "can_exec" and it contains allow rule:
> >>> define(`can_exec',`allow $1 $2:file { mmap_exec_file_perms ioctl lock
> >>> execute_no_trans };')
> > 
> > Sorry can_exec() should just use exec_file_perms which would should be mmap_exec_file_perms + execute_no_trans IMHO
> > 
> >>
> >> This should just use mmap_exec_file_perms
> >>
> 
> Should we remove lock permission?

I would say yes, but i am not sure why it was added in the first place

> 
> >>>
> >>> There is a mmap_exec_file_perms which contains:
> >>> define(`mmap_exec_file_perms',`{ getattr open map read execute ioctl }')
> >>>
> >>> Map is present in can_exec().
> >>>
> >>> So for domain transitions we don't allow map permission from calling
> >>> domain on binary type but in can_exec macro there is map permission.
> >>>
> >>> I think this is a bug and in "domain_transition_pattern" there should be
> >>> this line:
> >>> allow $1 $2:file { getattr open read execute map };
> >>
> >> This should just use mmap_exec_file_perms as well
> >>
> >>>
> >>> instead of:
> >>> allow $1 $2:file { getattr open read execute };
> >>>
> >>> Am I right or missing something?
> >>>
> >>> Thanks for help!
> >>> Lukas.
> >>
> >> permission sets provide a single point of failure and should used as much as possible
> >>
> >> These were overlooked and because of this we now have a good example what the purpose of permission sets and patterns is.
> >>
> 
> Thanks, I'll prepare patch.
> 
> Lukas.
> 
> >>>
> >>> -- 
> >>> Lukas Vrabec
> >>> Software Engineer, Security Technologies
> >>> Red Hat, Inc.
> >>>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> refpolicy mailing list
> >>> refpolicy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >>> http://oss.tresys.com/mailman/listinfo/refpolicy
> >>
> >>
> >> -- 
> >> Key fingerprint = 5F4D 3CDB D3F8 3652 FBD8  02D5 3B6C 5F1D 2C7B 6B02
> >> https://sks-keyservers.net/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x3B6C5F1D2C7B6B02
> >> Dominick Grift
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > _______________________________________________
> > refpolicy mailing list
> > refpolicy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > http://oss.tresys.com/mailman/listinfo/refpolicy
> > 
> 
> 
> -- 
> Lukas Vrabec
> Software Engineer, Security Technologies
> Red Hat, Inc.
> 




> _______________________________________________
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> refpolicy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> http://oss.tresys.com/mailman/listinfo/refpolicy


-- 
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https://sks-keyservers.net/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x3B6C5F1D2C7B6B02
Dominick Grift

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