On Sun, 2017-12-03 at 20:33 +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> On 2017/12/02 3:52, syzbot wrote:
> > ==================================================================
> > BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strcmp+0x96/0xb0 lib/string.c:328
> > Read of size 1 at addr ffff8801cd99d2c1 by task
> > syzkaller242593/3087
> >
> > CPU: 0 PID: 3087 Comm: syzkaller242593 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc1-next-
> > 20171201+ #57
> > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine,
> > BIOS Google 01/01/2011
> > Call Trace:
> > __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
> > dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53
> > print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252
> > kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
> > kasan_report+0x25b/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
> > __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
> > strcmp+0x96/0xb0 lib/string.c:328
>
> This seems to be out of bound read for "scontext" at
>
> for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
> if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) {
> *sid = i;
> return 0;
> }
> }
>
> because "initial_sid_to_string[i]" is "const char *".
>
> > security_context_to_sid_core+0x437/0x620
> > security/selinux/ss/services.c:1420
> > security_context_to_sid+0x32/0x40
> > security/selinux/ss/services.c:1479
> > selinux_setprocattr+0x51c/0xb50 security/selinux/hooks.c:5986
> > security_setprocattr+0x85/0xc0 security/security.c:1264
>
> If "value" does not terminate with '\0' or '\n', "value" and
> "size" are as-is passed to "scontext" and "scontext_len" above
>
> /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
> if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
> if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
> str[size-1] = 0;
> size--;
> }
> error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid,
> GFP_KERNEL);
>
> which will allow strcmp() to trigger out of bound read when "size" is
> larger than strlen(initial_sid_to_string[i]).
>
> Thus, I guess the simplest fix is to use strncmp() instead of
> strcmp().
Already fixed by
https://www.spinics.net/lists/selinux/msg23589.html
>
> > proc_pid_attr_write+0x1e6/0x280 fs/proc/base.c:2574
> > __vfs_write+0xef/0x970 fs/read_write.c:480
> > __kernel_write+0xfe/0x350 fs/read_write.c:501
> > write_pipe_buf+0x175/0x220 fs/splice.c:797
> > splice_from_pipe_feed fs/splice.c:502 [inline]
> > __splice_from_pipe+0x328/0x730 fs/splice.c:626
> > splice_from_pipe+0x1e9/0x330 fs/splice.c:661
> > default_file_splice_write+0x40/0x90 fs/splice.c:809
> > do_splice_from fs/splice.c:851 [inline]
> > direct_splice_actor+0x125/0x180 fs/splice.c:1018
> > splice_direct_to_actor+0x2c1/0x820 fs/splice.c:973
> > do_splice_direct+0x2a7/0x3d0 fs/splice.c:1061
> > do_sendfile+0x5d5/0xe90 fs/read_write.c:1413
> > SYSC_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1468 [inline]
> > SyS_sendfile64+0xbd/0x160 fs/read_write.c:1460
> > entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
