On Thu, Nov 2, 2017 at 8:58 AM, Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Wed, 2017-11-01 at 17:39 -0400, Paul Moore wrote: >> On Tue, Oct 31, 2017 at 7:08 PM, Florian Westphal <fw@xxxxxxxxx> >> wrote: >> > Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> > > On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 10:58 AM, Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxx. >> > > gov> wrote: >> > > > matching before (as in this patch) or after calling >> > > > xfrm_bundle_ok()? >> > > >> > > I would probably make the LSM call the last check, as you've >> > > done; but >> > > I have to say that is just so it is consistent with the "LSM >> > > last" >> > > philosophy and not because of any performance related argument. >> > > >> > > > ... Also, >> > > > do we need to test xfrm->sel.family before calling >> > > > xfrm_selector_match >> > > > (as in this patch) or not - xfrm_state_look_at() does so when >> > > > the >> > > > state is XFRM_STATE_VALID but not when it is _ERROR or >> > > > _EXPIRED? >> > > >> > > Speaking purely from a SELinux perspective, I'm not sure it >> > > matters: >> > > as long as the labels match we are happy. However, from a >> > > general >> > > IPsec perspective it does seem like a reasonable thing. >> > > >> > > Granted I'm probably missing something, but it seems a little odd >> > > that >> > > the code isn't already checking that the selectors match (... >> > > what am >> > > I missing?). It does check the policies, maybe that is enough in >> > > the >> > > normal IPsec case? >> > >> > The assumption was that identical policies would yield the same >> > SAs, >> > but thats not correct. >> >> Well, to be fair, I think the assumption is valid for normal, >> unlabeled IPsec. The problem comes when SELinux starts labeling SAs >> and now you have multiple SAs for a given policy, each differing only >> in the SELinux/LSM label. > > No, it is invalid for normal, unlabeled IPSEC too, in the case where > one has defined xfrm state selectors. That's what my other testsuite > patch (which is presently only on the xfrmselectortest branch) is > exercising - matching of xfrm state selectors. But in any event, > Florian's patch fixes both, so I'm fine with it. I don't know though > how it compares performance-wise with walking the bundle and just > calling security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match() and xfrm_selector_match() > on each one. > >> Considering that adding the SELinux/LSM label effectively adds an >> additional selector, I'm wondering if we should simply add the >> SELinux/LSM label matching to xfrm_selector_match()? Looking quickly >> at the code it seems as though we always follow xfrm_selector_match() >> with a LSM check anyway, the one exception being in >> __xfrm_policy_check() ... which *might* be a valid exception, as we >> don't do our access checks for inbound traffic at that point in the >> stack. > > Possibly, but that should probably be a separate patch. We should just > fix this regression for 4.14, either via Florian's patch or by > augmenting my patch to perform the matching calls on all of the xfrms. I agree that v4.14 should get the smallest patch possible that fixes the problem. I was just looking at the patches presented so far and thinking out loud. -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com
