On Thu, 2017-10-05 at 00:47 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > On Mon, Oct 02, 2017 at 11:58:19AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > The selinux netlink socket is used to notify userspace of changes > > to > > the enforcing mode and policy reloads. At present, these > > notifications > > are always sent to the initial network namespace. In order to > > support > > multiple selinux namespaces, each with its own enforcing mode and > > policy, we need to create and use a separate selinux netlink socket > > for each network namespace. > > ... > > > +static int __init selnl_init(void) > > +{ > > + if (register_pernet_subsys(&selnl_net_ops)) > > + panic("Could not register selinux netlink > > operations\n"); > > return 0; > > } > > This doesn't seem right to me. If the socket is only used to send > notifications to userspace, then every net_ns doesn't need a socket, > only the first netns that the selinux ns was associated, right? What does "the first netns that the selinux ns was associated" mean? We could unshare them in any order; in the sample command sequence I gave in the patch description for "selinux: add a selinuxfs interface to unshare selinux namespace", I unshared the SELinux namespace first, then the network namespace, but we could just as easily do it in the reverse order (or at the same time if unshare(2) supported that). So you can't assume that the network namespace in which you are running at the time you unshare selinux namespace is the right one, nor that the first unshare of the network namespace after unsharing the selinux namespace is the right one (not that we even have a way to catch that currently). > So long as there is a way to find the netns to which an selinux ns > is tied, a userspace logger could even setns into that netns to > listen > for updates, if it wasn't certain to be in the right ns when it ran. > > Otherwise (I haven't peeked ahead) you'll have to keep the *list* of > net_ns which live in a given selinuxfs and copy all messages to all > of > those namesapces? No, we only deliver to the network namespace of the process that performed the setenforce or policy load (most commonly init, could also be an admin running a management command or installing a policy rpm). We assume the container runtime properly handles unsharing of the mount, network, and selinux namespaces before launching the container init. A container process that subsequently unshares its network namespace won't see notifications for any subsequent policy reloads or setenforce calls. I don't know if that will prove to be a problem in practice.