On 9/8/2017 9:40 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> commit d178bc3a708f39cbfefc3fab37032d3f2511b4ec ("user namespace: usb:
> make usb urbs user namespace aware (v2)") changed kill_pid_info_as_uid
> to kill_pid_info_as_cred, saving and passing a cred structure instead of
> uids. Since the secid can be obtained from the cred, drop the secid fields
> from the usb_dev_state and async structures, and drop the secid argument to
> kill_pid_info_as_cred. Replace the secid argument to security_task_kill
> with the cred. Update SELinux, Smack, and AppArmor to use the cred, which
> avoids the need for Smack and AppArmor to use a secid at all in this hook.
> Further changes to Smack might still be required to take full advantage of
> this change, since it should now be possible to perform capability
> checking based on the supplied cred. The changes to Smack and AppArmor
> have only been compile-tested.
>
> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Smack tests seem ok with this.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> drivers/usb/core/devio.c | 10 ++--------
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 +++--
> include/linux/sched/signal.h | 2 +-
> include/linux/security.h | 4 ++--
> kernel/signal.c | 6 +++---
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 17 ++++++++++++-----
> security/security.c | 4 ++--
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 7 +++++--
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 12 +++++-------
> 9 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/devio.c b/drivers/usb/core/devio.c
> index ebe2759..b44f74c 100644
> --- a/drivers/usb/core/devio.c
> +++ b/drivers/usb/core/devio.c
> @@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ struct usb_dev_state {
> const struct cred *cred;
> void __user *disccontext;
> unsigned long ifclaimed;
> - u32 secid;
> u32 disabled_bulk_eps;
> bool privileges_dropped;
> unsigned long interface_allowed_mask;
> @@ -108,7 +107,6 @@ struct async {
> struct usb_memory *usbm;
> unsigned int mem_usage;
> int status;
> - u32 secid;
> u8 bulk_addr;
> u8 bulk_status;
> };
> @@ -596,7 +594,6 @@ static void async_completed(struct urb *urb)
> struct usb_dev_state *ps = as->ps;
> struct siginfo sinfo;
> struct pid *pid = NULL;
> - u32 secid = 0;
> const struct cred *cred = NULL;
> int signr;
>
> @@ -612,7 +609,6 @@ static void async_completed(struct urb *urb)
> sinfo.si_addr = as->userurb;
> pid = get_pid(as->pid);
> cred = get_cred(as->cred);
> - secid = as->secid;
> }
> snoop(&urb->dev->dev, "urb complete\n");
> snoop_urb(urb->dev, as->userurb, urb->pipe, urb->actual_length,
> @@ -626,7 +622,7 @@ static void async_completed(struct urb *urb)
> spin_unlock(&ps->lock);
>
> if (signr) {
> - kill_pid_info_as_cred(sinfo.si_signo, &sinfo, pid, cred, secid);
> + kill_pid_info_as_cred(sinfo.si_signo, &sinfo, pid, cred);
> put_pid(pid);
> put_cred(cred);
> }
> @@ -1023,7 +1019,6 @@ static int usbdev_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> init_waitqueue_head(&ps->wait);
> ps->disc_pid = get_pid(task_pid(current));
> ps->cred = get_current_cred();
> - security_task_getsecid(current, &ps->secid);
> smp_wmb();
> list_add_tail(&ps->list, &dev->filelist);
> file->private_data = ps;
> @@ -1733,7 +1728,6 @@ static int proc_do_submiturb(struct usb_dev_state *ps, struct usbdevfs_urb *uurb
> as->ifnum = ifnum;
> as->pid = get_pid(task_pid(current));
> as->cred = get_current_cred();
> - security_task_getsecid(current, &as->secid);
> snoop_urb(ps->dev, as->userurb, as->urb->pipe,
> as->urb->transfer_buffer_length, 0, SUBMIT,
> NULL, 0);
> @@ -2609,7 +2603,7 @@ static void usbdev_remove(struct usb_device *udev)
> sinfo.si_code = SI_ASYNCIO;
> sinfo.si_addr = ps->disccontext;
> kill_pid_info_as_cred(ps->discsignr, &sinfo,
> - ps->disc_pid, ps->cred, ps->secid);
> + ps->disc_pid, ps->cred);
> }
> }
> }
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index ce02f76..b0b663b2 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -674,7 +674,8 @@
> * @p contains the task_struct for process.
> * @info contains the signal information.
> * @sig contains the signal value.
> - * @secid contains the sid of the process where the signal originated
> + * @cred contains the cred of the process where the signal originated, or
> + * NULL if the current task is the originator.
> * Return 0 if permission is granted.
> * @task_prctl:
> * Check permission before performing a process control operation on the
> @@ -1533,7 +1534,7 @@ union security_list_options {
> int (*task_getscheduler)(struct task_struct *p);
> int (*task_movememory)(struct task_struct *p);
> int (*task_kill)(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
> - int sig, u32 secid);
> + int sig, const struct cred *cred);
> int (*task_prctl)(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
> unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
> void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
> diff --git a/include/linux/sched/signal.h b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
> index 2a0dd40..ae4fe12 100644
> --- a/include/linux/sched/signal.h
> +++ b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
> @@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ extern int force_sig_info(int, struct siginfo *, struct task_struct *);
> extern int __kill_pgrp_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct pid *pgrp);
> extern int kill_pid_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct pid *pid);
> extern int kill_pid_info_as_cred(int, struct siginfo *, struct pid *,
> - const struct cred *, u32);
> + const struct cred *);
> extern int kill_pgrp(struct pid *pid, int sig, int priv);
> extern int kill_pid(struct pid *pid, int sig, int priv);
> extern __must_check bool do_notify_parent(struct task_struct *, int);
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 458e24b..9655621 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p);
> int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p);
> int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p);
> int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
> - int sig, u32 secid);
> + int sig, const struct cred *cred);
> int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
> unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
> void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
> @@ -1015,7 +1015,7 @@ static inline int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
>
> static inline int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p,
> struct siginfo *info, int sig,
> - u32 secid)
> + const struct cred *cred)
> {
> return 0;
> }
> diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
> index caed913..a397bb9 100644
> --- a/kernel/signal.c
> +++ b/kernel/signal.c
> @@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info,
> }
> }
>
> - return security_task_kill(t, info, sig, 0);
> + return security_task_kill(t, info, sig, NULL);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -1348,7 +1348,7 @@ static int kill_as_cred_perm(const struct cred *cred,
>
> /* like kill_pid_info(), but doesn't use uid/euid of "current" */
> int kill_pid_info_as_cred(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct pid *pid,
> - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid)
> + const struct cred *cred)
> {
> int ret = -EINVAL;
> struct task_struct *p;
> @@ -1367,7 +1367,7 @@ int kill_pid_info_as_cred(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct pid *pid,
> ret = -EPERM;
> goto out_unlock;
> }
> - ret = security_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
> + ret = security_task_kill(p, info, sig, cred);
> if (ret)
> goto out_unlock;
>
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index cc5ab23..2fbec6d 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -718,16 +718,23 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
> }
>
> static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct siginfo *info,
> - int sig, u32 secid)
> + int sig, const struct cred *cred)
> {
> struct aa_label *cl, *tl;
> int error;
>
> - if (secid)
> - /* TODO: after secid to label mapping is done.
> - * Dealing with USB IO specific behavior
> + if (cred) {
> + /*
> + * Dealing with USB IO specific behavior
> */
> - return 0;
> + cl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
> + tl = aa_get_task_label(target);
> + error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig);
> + aa_put_label(cl);
> + aa_put_label(tl);
> + return error;
> + }
> +
> cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
> tl = aa_get_task_label(target);
> error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig);
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 55b5997..3b67842 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1118,9 +1118,9 @@ int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
> }
>
> int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
> - int sig, u32 secid)
> + int sig, const struct cred *cred)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, secid);
> + return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, cred);
> }
>
> int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 45943e1..68bc634 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -4041,16 +4041,19 @@ static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
> }
>
> static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
> - int sig, u32 secid)
> + int sig, const struct cred *cred)
> {
> + u32 secid;
> u32 perm;
>
> if (!sig)
> perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
> else
> perm = signal_to_av(sig);
> - if (!secid)
> + if (!cred)
> secid = current_sid();
> + else
> + secid = cred_sid(cred);
> return avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 463af86..65fcede 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -2259,15 +2259,13 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
> * @p: the task object
> * @info: unused
> * @sig: unused
> - * @secid: identifies the smack to use in lieu of current's
> + * @cred: identifies the cred to use in lieu of current's
> *
> * Return 0 if write access is permitted
> *
> - * The secid behavior is an artifact of an SELinux hack
> - * in the USB code. Someday it may go away.
> */
> static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
> - int sig, u32 secid)
> + int sig, const struct cred *cred)
> {
> struct smk_audit_info ad;
> struct smack_known *skp;
> @@ -2283,17 +2281,17 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
> * Sending a signal requires that the sender
> * can write the receiver.
> */
> - if (secid == 0) {
> + if (cred == NULL) {
> rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
> rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
> return rc;
> }
> /*
> - * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
> + * If the cred isn't NULL we're dealing with some USB IO
> * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
> * we can't take privilege into account.
> */
> - skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
> + skp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
> rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
> rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
> return rc;
