Re: [RFC][PATCH] selinux: Introduce a policy capability and permission for NNP transitions

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On 07/12/2017 05:38 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 9:26 AM, Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Tue, 2017-07-11 at 17:00 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
On Mon, Jul 10, 2017 at 4:25 PM, Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:

While I think splitting the NNP/nosuid transition restrictions might
be a good idea under the new policy capability, I'm not sure it is
worth the cost of a "process2" object class.

With that in mind, let's do two things with this patch:

* Mention the nosuid restrictions in the patch description.  It
doesn't need much text, but something would be good so we have
documentation in the git log.

* Let's pick a new permission name that is not specific to NNP or
nosuid.  IMHO, nnpnosuid_transition is ... less than good.
Unfortunately, I'm not sure I'm much better at picking names; how
about "protected_transition"?  "restricted_transition"?
"enable_transition"?  "override_transition"?

I vote for nnp_transition anyway. "No New Privileges" encompasses nosuid in my mind. If the two perms had been separated I would have been inclined to allow both every time one of them was needed, to make sure no one was surprised by the behavior difference.


--
Chris PeBenito




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