Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: log policy capability state when a policy is loaded

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On Wed, May 17, 2017 at 4:45 PM, Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Wed, 2017-05-17 at 15:39 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:

...

>> Isn't that the right thing to do anyway?  You shouldn't use a policy
>> with a policy capability on a kernel that has no knowledge of the
>> policy capability for the reasons we've already discussed.  I'm also
>> going to guess that this isn't as large a problem as we may be making
>> it out, distributions should catch this problem fairly quickly in
>> their development process and those that are savvy enough to load
>> their own policy should know how to handle this as well.
>
> Possibly I overstated the seriousness of using a policy with an unknown
> policy capability ;)

There ya go, you just made me threaten to fail the policy load to get here ;)

> Historically we have preserved compatibility in
> policies so that old kernels continued to work correctly even if they
> do not support the capability, and you would only lose out on the
> ability to leverage that capability for improved access control.

Yes, I agree that I don't think this is a serious issue with any of
the existing policy capabilities.

> I don't think we can/should rely on the distributions to ensure that
> users don't end up with unbootable systems ...

I obviously agree, how could one not?  However, I also think we need
to take a realistic view of distributions that take use rather extreme
default configurations and don't ensure that their updates are
properly managed.  I don't see the point in arguing every possible
combination in this thread (I think we all have other more important
things to do, at least I hope we do), but I don't want to be held
responsible if a distro shoots *itself* in the foot.

>> > A warning seemed like a reasonable middle ground between silently
>> > ignoring unknown policy capabilities (as the kernel currently does
>> > before this patch) and rejecting the policy altogether.  WARN vs
>> > INFO
>> > was due to the fact that an unknown capability seemed more
>> > significant
>> > and potentially an indicator of a kernel/policy mismatch than the
>> > state
>> > of the known policy capabilities.
>
> Still think warning is best.  Willing to degrade to info.  Not willing
> to fail on policy load.

INFO please.

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com



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