On Wed, 2017-04-12 at 15:30 +0200, Sebastien Buisson wrote: > 2017-04-12 13:55 GMT+02:00 Paul Moore <pmoore@xxxxxxxxxx>: > > As currently written this code isn't something we would want to > > merge > > upstream for two important reasons: > > > > * No abstraction layer at the LSM interface. The core kernel code > > should not call directly into any specific LSM, all interaction > > should > > go through the LSM hooks. > > The idea behind this patch and the other one was to replicate what is > done with selinux_is_enabled(). As I understand it now, > selinux_is_enabled() should remain the only exception to the LSM > hooks. > So do you agree if I propose a new security_is_enforced() function at > the LSM abstraction layer, which will be hooked to a > selinux_is_enforced() function defined inside the SELinux LSM? Even your usage of selinux_is_enabled() looks suspect; that should probably go away. Only other user of it seems to be some cred validity checking that could be dropped as well. The include/linux/selinux.h interfaces were originally for use by audit and secmark when there were no other LSMs and have gradually been removed. _______________________________________________ Selinux mailing list Selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxx. To get help, send an email containing "help" to Selinux-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxx.
