Re: New Blog on how SELinux blocked Docker container escape.

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Dear Sir,

Thanks. I was checking can we cat /etc/shadow in my testing environment.
It seems that is protected because that file's permission is set to "000".

Here is my test result;
--------------------------------------------------------------
----------. 1 root root system_u:object_r:shadow_t:s0
1268 Oct 13 07:55 /etc/shadow

SELinux Enforcing  -> Permission Denied
SELinux Permissive -> Permission Denied
SELinux Disabled -> Permission Denied

When I changed that permission to "755";

SELinux Enforcing  -> Could cat /etc/shadow
SELinux Permissive -> Could cat /etc/shadow
SELinux Disabled -> Could cat /etc/shadow

Then in this case that escaped user could
have read access to shadow_t label.
--------------------------------------------------------------

That "runc" process seems to be working as unconfined_t domain;

[root@fedora25 ~]# ps axZ|grep runc
unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 1578 pts/0 Sl+
0:00 runc run ctr

So, I'm not sure but I guess we would better to assign
other domain to "runc" program (no unconfined_t).

Let me check if we will run "runc" in other domain.

Kind Regards,

OMO

2017-01-18 23:14 GMT+09:00 Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@xxxxxxxxxx>:
>
>
> On 01/18/2017 12:05 AM, 面和毅 wrote:
>> Dear Sir,
>>
>> I'm member of Japan-SOSS SIG(Secure OSS Special
>> Interest Group).
>> We love SELinux(12years user) and we are promoting SELinux in Japan.
>>
>> >From technical interesting(we are promoting Docker
>> with SELinux), we did PoC for CVE-2016-9962 on Fedora25.
>>
>> Then we found current SELinux(maybe policy) does not
>> mitigate that vulnerability.
>>
>> We could reproduce that vulnerability with
>> - add CAP_SYS_PTRACE to container
>> - modified runc because there’s not so much race window on runc.
>> then we think it's not so easy in usual situation.
>> Also we couldn't reproduce it on CentOS7(latest).
>>
>> We posted that PoC result on our community blog.
>> https://jsosug.github.io/post/omok-selinux-docker-20170118/
>>
>> Also we wish to argue how can we protect this kind of
>> vulnerability by using SELinux.
>>
>> Kind Regards,
>>
>> OMO
> Attempt to cat /etc/shadow in your test to see the blockage.
>
> Here is a blog I wrote on the topic.
>
> http://rhelblog.redhat.com/2017/01/13/selinux-mitigates-container-vulnerability/
>



-- 
Kazuki Omo: ka-omo@xxxxxxxx
OSS &Security Evangelist
OSS Business Planning Dept.
CISSP #366942
Tel: +81364015149

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