Re: [PATCH] security,selinux,smack: kill security_task_wait hook

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On 1/10/2017 9:28 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> As reported by yangshukui, a permission denial from security_task_wait()
> can lead to a soft lockup in zap_pid_ns_processes() since it only expects
> sys_wait4() to return 0 or -ECHILD. Further, security_task_wait() can
> in general lead to zombies; in the absence of some way to automatically
> reparent a child process upon a denial, the hook is not useful.  Remove
> the security hook and its implementations in SELinux and Smack.  Smack
> already removed its check from its hook.
>
> Reported-by: yangshukui <yangshukui@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h  |  7 -------
>  include/linux/security.h   |  6 ------
>  kernel/exit.c              | 19 ++-----------------
>  security/security.c        |  6 ------
>  security/selinux/hooks.c   |  7 -------
>  security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 20 --------------------
>  6 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 0dde959..6fe7a5c 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -666,11 +666,6 @@
>   *	@sig contains the signal value.
>   *	@secid contains the sid of the process where the signal originated
>   *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
> - * @task_wait:
> - *	Check permission before allowing a process to reap a child process @p
> - *	and collect its status information.
> - *	@p contains the task_struct for process.
> - *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
>   * @task_prctl:
>   *	Check permission before performing a process control operation on the
>   *	current process.
> @@ -1507,7 +1502,6 @@ union security_list_options {
>  	int (*task_movememory)(struct task_struct *p);
>  	int (*task_kill)(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
>  				int sig, u32 secid);
> -	int (*task_wait)(struct task_struct *p);
>  	int (*task_prctl)(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
>  				unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
>  	void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
> @@ -1767,7 +1761,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
>  	struct list_head task_getscheduler;
>  	struct list_head task_movememory;
>  	struct list_head task_kill;
> -	struct list_head task_wait;
>  	struct list_head task_prctl;
>  	struct list_head task_to_inode;
>  	struct list_head ipc_permission;
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index f4ebac1..d3868f2 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -332,7 +332,6 @@ int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p);
>  int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p);
>  int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
>  			int sig, u32 secid);
> -int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p);
>  int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
>  			unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
>  void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
> @@ -980,11 +979,6 @@ static inline int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p,
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -static inline int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
> -{
> -	return 0;
> -}
> -
>  static inline int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2,
>  				      unsigned long arg3,
>  				      unsigned long arg4,
> diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
> index 8f14b86..60f2451 100644
> --- a/kernel/exit.c
> +++ b/kernel/exit.c
> @@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
>  #include <linux/tty.h>
>  #include <linux/iocontext.h>
>  #include <linux/key.h>
> -#include <linux/security.h>
>  #include <linux/cpu.h>
>  #include <linux/acct.h>
>  #include <linux/tsacct_kern.h>
> @@ -1360,7 +1359,7 @@ static int wait_task_continued(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *p)
>   * Returns nonzero for a final return, when we have unlocked tasklist_lock.
>   * Returns zero if the search for a child should continue;
>   * then ->notask_error is 0 if @p is an eligible child,
> - * or another error from security_task_wait(), or still -ECHILD.
> + * or still -ECHILD.
>   */
>  static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace,
>  				struct task_struct *p)
> @@ -1380,20 +1379,6 @@ static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace,
>  	if (!ret)
>  		return ret;
>  
> -	ret = security_task_wait(p);
> -	if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
> -		/*
> -		 * If we have not yet seen any eligible child,
> -		 * then let this error code replace -ECHILD.
> -		 * A permission error will give the user a clue
> -		 * to look for security policy problems, rather
> -		 * than for mysterious wait bugs.
> -		 */
> -		if (wo->notask_error)
> -			wo->notask_error = ret;
> -		return 0;
> -	}
> -
>  	if (unlikely(exit_state == EXIT_TRACE)) {
>  		/*
>  		 * ptrace == 0 means we are the natural parent. In this case
> @@ -1486,7 +1471,7 @@ static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace,
>   * Returns nonzero for a final return, when we have unlocked tasklist_lock.
>   * Returns zero if the search for a child should continue; then
>   * ->notask_error is 0 if there were any eligible children,
> - * or another error from security_task_wait(), or still -ECHILD.
> + * or still -ECHILD.
>   */
>  static int do_wait_thread(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *tsk)
>  {
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 32052f5..8c9fee5 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1025,11 +1025,6 @@ int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
>  	return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, secid);
>  }
>  
> -int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
> -{
> -	return call_int_hook(task_wait, 0, p);
> -}
> -
>  int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
>  			 unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
>  {
> @@ -1769,7 +1764,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = {
>  	.task_movememory =
>  		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_movememory),
>  	.task_kill =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_kill),
> -	.task_wait =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_wait),
>  	.task_prctl =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_prctl),
>  	.task_to_inode =
>  		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_to_inode),
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index bada3cd..720dbd0 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -3969,12 +3969,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
>  	return avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
>  }
>  
> -static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
> -{
> -	return avc_has_perm(task_sid(p), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
> -			    PROCESS__SIGCHLD, NULL);
> -}
> -
>  static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
>  				  struct inode *inode)
>  {
> @@ -6217,7 +6211,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
> -	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, selinux_task_wait),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
>  
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 8da4a6b..2166373 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -2272,25 +2272,6 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
>  }
>  
>  /**
> - * smack_task_wait - Smack access check for waiting
> - * @p: task to wait for
> - *
> - * Returns 0
> - */
> -static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
> -{
> -	/*
> -	 * Allow the operation to succeed.
> -	 * Zombies are bad.
> -	 * In userless environments (e.g. phones) programs
> -	 * get marked with SMACK64EXEC and even if the parent
> -	 * and child shouldn't be talking the parent still
> -	 * may expect to know when the child exits.
> -	 */
> -	return 0;
> -}
> -
> -/**
>   * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
>   * @p: task to copy from
>   * @inode: inode to copy to
> @@ -4658,7 +4639,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill),
> -	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, smack_task_wait),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode),
>  
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission),

_______________________________________________
Selinux mailing list
Selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxx.
To get help, send an email containing "help" to Selinux-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxx.



[Index of Archives]     [Selinux Refpolicy]     [Linux SGX]     [Fedora Users]     [Fedora Desktop]     [Yosemite Photos]     [Yosemite Camping]     [Yosemite Campsites]     [KDE Users]     [Gnome Users]

  Powered by Linux