On 01/09, yangshukui wrote:
>
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -3596,6 +3596,9 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p,
> struct siginfo *info,
>
> static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
> {
> + if (pid_vnr(task_tgid(current)) == 1){
> + return 0;
this check is not really correct, it can be a sub-thread... Doesn't matter,
please see below.
> + }
> return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
> }
> It work but it permit pid 1 process to reap child without selinux check. Can
> we have a better way to handle this problem?
I never understood why security_task_wait() should deny to reap a child. But
since it can we probably want some explicit "the whole namespace goes away" check.
We could use, say, PIDNS_HASH_ADDING but I'd suggest something like a trivial change
below for now.
Eric, what do you think?
Oleg.
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f825304..1330b4e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1027,6 +1027,9 @@ int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
{
+ /* must be the exiting child reaper */
+ if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_EXITING))
+ return 0;
return call_int_hook(task_wait, 0, p);
}
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