On Wed, Dec 21, 2016 at 2:04 AM, José Bollo <jobol@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Le mardi 20 décembre 2016 à 21:37 -0500, Paul Moore a écrit : >> On Fri, Dec 16, 2016 at 12:41 PM, Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> >> wrote: >> > Processes can only alter their own security attributes via >> > /proc/pid/attr nodes. This is presently enforced by each >> > individual >> > security module and is also imposed by the Linux credentials >> > implementation, which only allows a task to alter its own >> > credentials. >> > Move the check enforcing this restriction from the individual >> > security modules to proc_pid_attr_write() before calling the >> > security hook, >> > and drop the unnecessary task argument to the security hook since >> > it can >> > only ever be the current task. >> > >> > Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> >> > --- >> > fs/proc/base.c | 13 +++++++++---- >> > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 +-- >> > include/linux/security.h | 4 ++-- >> > security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 ++----- >> > security/security.c | 4 ++-- >> > security/selinux/hooks.c | 13 +------------ >> > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 11 +---------- >> > 7 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) >> >> Merged into the selinux#next branch. > > is it fair? I believe so, yes. As many have already mentioned, this patch doesn't introduce a new restriction, it simply cleans up an existing restriction. If/when PTAGS is merged upstream it can make any changes needed as long as those changes do not cause a regression in the safety or behavior of the existing LSMs and the kernel as a whole. -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com _______________________________________________ Selinux mailing list Selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxx. To get help, send an email containing "help" to Selinux-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxx.
