On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 10:39:03AM -0600, Seth Forshee wrote: > Hi Eric, > > Here's another update to my patches for user namespace mounts, based on > your for-testing branch. These patches add safeguards necessary to allow > unprivileged mounts and update SELinux and Smack to safely handle > device-backed mounts from unprivileged users. > > The v2 posting received very little in the way of feedback, so changes > are minimal. I've made a trivial style change to the Smack changes at > Casey's request, and I've added Stephen's ack for the SELinux changes. Would you mind explaining which filesystem types do you plan to allow? SELinux and the rest of Linux S&M bunch do fuck-all for attacks via handcrafted fs image fed to the code in fs driver that does not expect a given kind of inconsistencies. As it is, validation of on-disk metadata is not particularly strong; what's more, protection against concurrent malicious *changes* of fs image (via direct writes by root) is simply inexistent. So what is that about? _______________________________________________ Selinux mailing list Selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxx. To get help, send an email containing "help" to Selinux-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxx.
