On 10/05/2015 05:56 PM, Andreas Gruenbacher wrote: > On Mon, Oct 5, 2015 at 5:08 PM, Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> Not fond of these magic initialized values. > > That should be a solvable problem. > >> Is it always safe to call inode_doinit() from all callers of >> inode_has_perm()? > > As long as inode_has_perm is only used in contexts in which a file > permission check / acl check would be possible, I don't see why not. > >> What about the cases where isec->sid is used without going through >> inode_has_perm()? > > inode_has_perm seems to be called frequently and invalid labels seem > to be reload quickly, so this change may make SELinux work well enough > to be useful on top of gfs2 or similar. More checks would of course be > better. The ideal case would be to always reload invalid labels, but > that currently won't be possible because we don't have dentries > everywhere. > > I can't tell if this is this good enough to provide a useful level of > protection. In any case, without a patch like this, on gfs2 and > similar file systems, SELinux currently doesn't work at all. > > How we can make progress with this problem? I think we'd need to wrap all uses of inode->i_security with a helper that applies this test. FWIW, many/most of them seem to have a dentry available, including all callers of inode_has_perm itself, so you could just use inode_doinit_with_dentry() for all of those cases. Maybe just inline inode_has_perm() and get rid of it. Need to deal appropriately with situations like selinux_inode_permission with MAY_NOT_BLOCK. _______________________________________________ Selinux mailing list Selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxx. To get help, send an email containing "help" to Selinux-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxx.
