Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> On Wed, Sep 16, 2015 at 1:02 PM, Seth Forshee
> <seth.forshee@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>
>> - Consolidate the testing if a device node may be opened in a new
>> function may_open_dev.
>>
>> - Move the check for allowing access to device nodes on filesystems
>> not mounted in the initial user namespace from mount time to open
>> time and include it in may_open_dev.
>>
>> This set of changes removes the implicit adding of MNT_NODEV which
>> simplifies the logic in fs/namespace.c and removes a potentially
>> problematic user visible difference in how normal and unprivileged
>> mount namespaces work.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
>
>> - /* Only in special cases allow devices from mounts
>> - * created outside the initial user namespace.
>> - */
>> - if (!(type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT)) {
>> - flags |= MS_NODEV;
>> - mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV | MNT_LOCK_NODEV;
>> - }
>
> This is an ABI change. It's probably okay, but I think the commit
> message should make it clear what's happening.
You mean it should include in big flashing neon letters
***REGRESSION FIX***
?
It is longer in coming than I had hoped. But that is part of the reason
I did not fix the security hole this way. Getting the s_user_ns stuff
just so has been non-trivial.
I do agree that because this is a user visible change we do need to keep
our eyes peeled for pieces of userspace software that may depend on the
exact details of the current behavior.
Eric
_______________________________________________
Selinux mailing list
Selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxx.
To get help, send an email containing "help" to Selinux-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxx.
