Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] Add support for extracting modules

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On 8/7/2015 9:37 AM, Joshua Brindle wrote:
> Stephen Smalley wrote:
>> On 08/07/2015 04:09 AM, Sven Vermeulen wrote:
>>> Will you provide a patch to the reference policy to allow semanage_t
>>> to write into all kinds of directories?
>>>
>>> I personally see little value in this patch, as everything is readily
>>> accessible on the file system. Users who want to extract policies with
>>> semodule will now encounter policy issues where semanage_t is not
>>> allowed to write into the current working directory (depending where
>>> the user is at):
>>
>> Directly accessing files under /var/lib/selinux is not very
>> user-friendly or maintainable, as how the files are arranged and stored
>> is an implementation detail of libsemanage.
>>
> 
> Agreed, policy could (and maybe should) completely prevent users from
> messing around there, lest they corrupt something.

This is generally enforced in refpolicy, though a couple privileged
domains (eg package managers) can access it.

>> The change allows users a new workflow in which they can readily extract
>> a module (whether locally created or distro-provided), modify it, and
>> then re-install it (and automatically have their modified version
>> installed at higher priority, and thereby not clobber the
>> distro-provided one or be clobbered by subsequent policy updates.
>>
>> semanage is already given userdom_read_user_home_content_files() and
>> userdom_read_user_tmp_files() in order to support semodule -i from
>> either of those locations, so broadening that to userdom_manage doesn't
>> seem too onerous.
>>
>> Also, the situation doesn't seem terribly different from the already
>> existing semanage export facility, which takes a -f output_file option.
>>
> 
> Alternatively the module could always be output to stdout and then
> piping it to a file would use the users (or shells) domain rather than
> semanage_t.
>
> There is definitely an integrity violation with having such a privileged
> program read from user directories but I suppose that ship has sailed.

It's a side effect of the UBAC implementation, as all the users have the
same types for their home directory contents, but with different seusers.

-- 
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
www.tresys.com | oss.tresys.com
_______________________________________________
Selinux mailing list
Selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxx.
To get help, send an email containing "help" to Selinux-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxx.



[Index of Archives]     [Selinux Refpolicy]     [Linux SGX]     [Fedora Users]     [Fedora Desktop]     [Yosemite Photos]     [Yosemite Camping]     [Yosemite Campsites]     [KDE Users]     [Gnome Users]

  Powered by Linux