Re: Seeing new denial on AOSP 5.1.1 w.r.t shell request read access on lnk_file .

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On 06/05/2015 02:31 AM, Ravi Kumar wrote:
> Hi Team  ,
> I am seeing some new denial when running the CTS test cases  which is as
> follows
> 
> avc: denied { read } for pid=6013 comm="sh" name="app_process"
> dev="mmcblk0p24" ino=410 scontext=u:r:shell:s0
> tcontext=u:object_r:zygote_exec:s0 tclass=lnk_file permissive=0
> 
> where app_process is link created to point app_process32/app_process64
> binary when doing a  ls -Z  i see the context of this is as expected
> and  tcontext on the denial  is also as expected (as below ).
> 
> root# ls -Z |grep app
> lrwxr-xr-x root     shell             u:object_r:zygote_exec:s0
> app_process -> app_process64
> -rwxr-xr-x root     shell             u:object_r:zygote_exec:s0
> app_process32
> -rwxr-xr-x root     shell             u:object_r:zygote_exec:s0
> app_process64
> 
> 
> I can see that there are NO changes in sepolicy for shell domain /
> Zygote domain.
> Only change is the kernel migration from 3.10.48  to 3.10.73(policy
> version 28)  and i see there are  couple of changes done in security .
> Looking at the changes  I don't see any suspicious changes which could
> impact the shell domain nature. Adding the rule is surely  going to
> addressing the issue but wonder why at first place it is needed  from
> security point of view i don't think adding just read should create a
> problem as the  lnk_files is as good as common_file and to as 
> write/execute are not given should not be at risk.  Please let me know
> if we have any changes which could cause this or any comment on this
> will be of great help .

(cc seandroid-list, as that is the list for Android-specific SELinux
questions)

On lollipop-mr1-release, we have the following in file_contexts:
$ grep app_process file_contexts
/system/bin/app_process32	u:object_r:zygote_exec:s0
/system/bin/app_process64	u:object_r:zygote_exec:s0
so the /system/bin/app_process symbolic link should just be labeled
system_file.


_______________________________________________
Selinux mailing list
Selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxx.
To get help, send an email containing "help" to Selinux-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxx.




[Index of Archives]     [Selinux Refpolicy]     [Linux SGX]     [Fedora Users]     [Fedora Desktop]     [Yosemite Photos]     [Yosemite Camping]     [Yosemite Campsites]     [KDE Users]     [Gnome Users]

  Powered by Linux