On 04/29/2015 03:56 PM, Jeff Vander Stoep wrote:
> Extend the generic ioctl permission check with support for per-command
> filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may
> additionally include a set of commands. Example:
>
> allow <source> <target>:<class> { 0x8910-0x8926 0x892A-0x8935 }
> auditallow <source> <target>:<class> 0x892A
>
> When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This
> feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl
> permission which may be too imprecise in some circumstances. For
> example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and
> benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as
> dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute
> to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering
> provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and
> limit applications to the subset of commands required.
>
> The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl
> commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to
> POLICYDB_VERSION_IOCTL_OPERATIONS=30 to account for the format change.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> This version fixes policy write for ioctl operations
>
> Patch v3 omits the type field when writing out the contents of the
> avtab from /sys/fs/selinux/policy. This leads to a corrupt output. No impact
> on the running kernel or its loaded policy.
>
> Diff between v3 and v4 found here:
> https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/148733/2
>
>
> security/selinux/avc.c | 424 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 40 +++-
> security/selinux/include/avc.h | 5 +
> security/selinux/include/security.h | 34 ++-
> security/selinux/ss/avtab.c | 94 ++++++--
> security/selinux/ss/avtab.h | 25 ++-
> security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 32 ++-
> security/selinux/ss/conditional.h | 6 +-
> security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 5 +
> security/selinux/ss/services.c | 202 +++++++++++++++--
> security/selinux/ss/services.h | 6 +
> 11 files changed, 813 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
> index 3c17dda..47918fa 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/avc.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
> @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
> #include <linux/init.h>
> #include <linux/skbuff.h>
> #include <linux/percpu.h>
> +#include <linux/list.h>
> #include <net/sock.h>
> #include <linux/un.h>
> #include <net/af_unix.h>
> @@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ struct avc_entry {
> u32 tsid;
> u16 tclass;
> struct av_decision avd;
> + struct avc_operation_node *ops_node;
> };
>
> struct avc_node {
> @@ -64,6 +66,16 @@ struct avc_cache {
> u32 latest_notif; /* latest revocation notification */
> };
>
> +struct avc_operation_decision_node {
> + struct operation_decision od;
> + struct list_head od_list;
> +};
> +
> +struct avc_operation_node {
> + struct operation ops;
> + struct list_head od_head; /* list of operation_decision_node */
> +};
> +
> struct avc_callback_node {
> int (*callback) (u32 event);
> u32 events;
> @@ -80,6 +92,9 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats) = { 0 };
> static struct avc_cache avc_cache;
> static struct avc_callback_node *avc_callbacks;
> static struct kmem_cache *avc_node_cachep;
> +static struct kmem_cache *avc_operation_decision_node_cachep;
> +static struct kmem_cache *avc_operation_node_cachep;
> +static struct kmem_cache *avc_operation_perm_cachep;
>
> static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
> {
> @@ -171,6 +186,16 @@ void __init avc_init(void)
>
> avc_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_node", sizeof(struct avc_node),
> 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
> + avc_operation_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_operation_node",
> + sizeof(struct avc_operation_node),
> + 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
> + avc_operation_decision_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create(
> + "avc_operation_decision_node",
> + sizeof(struct avc_operation_decision_node),
> + 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
> + avc_operation_perm_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_operation_perm",
> + sizeof(struct operation_perm),
> + 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
>
> audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "AVC INITIALIZED\n");
> }
> @@ -205,9 +230,271 @@ int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page)
> slots_used, AVC_CACHE_SLOTS, max_chain_len);
> }
>
> +/*
> + * using a linked list for operation_decision lookup because the list is
> + * always small. i.e. less than 5, typically 1
> + */
> +static struct operation_decision *avc_operation_lookup(u8 type,
> + struct avc_operation_node *ops_node)
> +{
> + struct avc_operation_decision_node *od_node;
> + struct operation_decision *od = NULL;
> +
> + list_for_each_entry(od_node, &ops_node->od_head, od_list) {
> + if (od_node->od.type != type)
> + continue;
> + od = &od_node->od;
> + break;
> + }
> + return od;
> +}
> +
> +static inline unsigned int avc_operation_has_perm(struct operation_decision *od,
> + u16 cmd, u8 specified)
> +{
> + unsigned int rc = 0;
> + u8 num = cmd & 0xff;
> +
> + if ((specified == OPERATION_ALLOWED) &&
> + (od->specified & OPERATION_ALLOWED))
> + rc = security_operation_test(od->allowed->perms, num);
> + else if ((specified == OPERATION_AUDITALLOW) &&
> + (od->specified & OPERATION_AUDITALLOW))
> + rc = security_operation_test(od->auditallow->perms, num);
> + else if ((specified == OPERATION_DONTAUDIT) &&
> + (od->specified & OPERATION_DONTAUDIT))
> + rc = security_operation_test(od->dontaudit->perms, num);
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static void avc_operation_allow_perm(struct avc_operation_node *node, u16 cmd)
> +{
> + struct operation_decision *od;
> + u8 type;
> + u8 num;
> +
> + type = cmd >> 8;
> + num = cmd & 0xff;
> + security_operation_set(node->ops.type, type);
> + od = avc_operation_lookup(type, node);
> + if (od && od->allowed)
> + security_operation_set(od->allowed->perms, num);
> +}
> +
> +static void avc_operation_decision_free(
> + struct avc_operation_decision_node *od_node)
> +{
> + struct operation_decision *od;
> +
> + od = &od_node->od;
> + if (od->allowed)
> + kmem_cache_free(avc_operation_perm_cachep, od->allowed);
> + if (od->auditallow)
> + kmem_cache_free(avc_operation_perm_cachep, od->auditallow);
> + if (od->dontaudit)
> + kmem_cache_free(avc_operation_perm_cachep, od->dontaudit);
> + kmem_cache_free(avc_operation_decision_node_cachep, od_node);
> +}
> +
> +static void avc_operation_free(struct avc_operation_node *ops_node)
> +{
> + struct avc_operation_decision_node *od_node, *tmp;
> +
> + if (!ops_node)
> + return;
> +
> + list_for_each_entry_safe(od_node, tmp, &ops_node->od_head, od_list) {
> + list_del(&od_node->od_list);
> + avc_operation_decision_free(od_node);
> + }
> + kmem_cache_free(avc_operation_node_cachep, ops_node);
> +}
> +
> +static void avc_copy_operation_decision(struct operation_decision *dest,
> + struct operation_decision *src)
> +{
> + dest->type = src->type;
> + dest->specified = src->specified;
> + if (dest->specified & OPERATION_ALLOWED)
> + memcpy(dest->allowed->perms, src->allowed->perms,
> + sizeof(src->allowed->perms));
> + if (dest->specified & OPERATION_AUDITALLOW)
> + memcpy(dest->auditallow->perms, src->auditallow->perms,
> + sizeof(src->auditallow->perms));
> + if (dest->specified & OPERATION_DONTAUDIT)
> + memcpy(dest->dontaudit->perms, src->dontaudit->perms,
> + sizeof(src->dontaudit->perms));
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * similar to avc_copy_operation_decision, but only copy decision
> + * information relevant to this command
> + */
> +static inline void avc_quick_copy_operation_decision(u16 cmd,
> + struct operation_decision *dest,
> + struct operation_decision *src)
> +{
> + /*
> + * compute index of the u32 of the 256 bits (8 u32s) that contain this
> + * command permission
> + */
> + u8 i = (0xff & cmd) >> 5;
> +
> + dest->specified = src->specified;
> + if (dest->specified & OPERATION_ALLOWED)
> + dest->allowed->perms[i] = src->allowed->perms[i];
> + if (dest->specified & OPERATION_AUDITALLOW)
> + dest->auditallow->perms[i] = src->auditallow->perms[i];
> + if (dest->specified & OPERATION_DONTAUDIT)
> + dest->dontaudit->perms[i] = src->dontaudit->perms[i];
> +}
> +
> +static struct avc_operation_decision_node
> + *avc_operation_decision_alloc(u8 specified)
> +{
> + struct avc_operation_decision_node *node;
> + struct operation_decision *od;
> +
> + node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_operation_decision_node_cachep,
> + GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
> + if (!node)
> + return NULL;
> +
> + od = &node->od;
> + if (specified & OPERATION_ALLOWED) {
> + od->allowed = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_operation_perm_cachep,
> + GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
> + if (!od->allowed)
> + goto error;
> + }
> + if (specified & OPERATION_AUDITALLOW) {
> + od->auditallow = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_operation_perm_cachep,
> + GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
> + if (!od->auditallow)
> + goto error;
> + }
> + if (specified & OPERATION_DONTAUDIT) {
> + od->dontaudit = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_operation_perm_cachep,
> + GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
> + if (!od->dontaudit)
> + goto error;
> + }
> + return node;
> +error:
> + avc_operation_decision_free(node);
> + return NULL;
> +}
> +
> +static int avc_add_operation(struct avc_node *node,
> + struct operation_decision *od)
> +{
> + struct avc_operation_decision_node *dest_od;
> +
> + node->ae.ops_node->ops.len++;
> + dest_od = avc_operation_decision_alloc(od->specified);
> + if (!dest_od)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + avc_copy_operation_decision(&dest_od->od, od);
> + list_add(&dest_od->od_list, &node->ae.ops_node->od_head);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static struct avc_operation_node *avc_operation_alloc(void)
> +{
> + struct avc_operation_node *ops;
> +
> + ops = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_operation_node_cachep,
> + GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
> + if (!ops)
> + return ops;
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ops->od_head);
> + return ops;
> +}
> +
> +static int avc_operation_populate(struct avc_node *node,
> + struct avc_operation_node *src)
> +{
> + struct avc_operation_node *dest;
> + struct avc_operation_decision_node *dest_od;
> + struct avc_operation_decision_node *src_od;
> +
> + if (src->ops.len == 0)
> + return 0;
> + dest = avc_operation_alloc();
> + if (!dest)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + memcpy(dest->ops.type, &src->ops.type, sizeof(dest->ops.type));
> + dest->ops.len = src->ops.len;
> +
> + /* for each source od allocate a destination od and copy */
> + list_for_each_entry(src_od, &src->od_head, od_list) {
> + dest_od = avc_operation_decision_alloc(src_od->od.specified);
> + if (!dest_od)
> + goto error;
> + avc_copy_operation_decision(&dest_od->od, &src_od->od);
> + list_add(&dest_od->od_list, &dest->od_head);
> + }
> + node->ae.ops_node = dest;
> + return 0;
> +error:
> + avc_operation_free(dest);
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +}
> +
> +static inline u32 avc_operation_audit_required(u32 requested,
> + struct av_decision *avd,
> + struct operation_decision *od,
> + u16 cmd,
> + int result,
> + u32 *deniedp)
> +{
> + u32 denied, audited;
> +
> + denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
> + if (unlikely(denied)) {
> + audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
> + if (audited && od) {
> + if (avc_operation_has_perm(od, cmd,
> + OPERATION_DONTAUDIT))
> + audited &= ~requested;
> + }
> + } else if (result) {
> + audited = denied = requested;
> + } else {
> + audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
> + if (audited && od) {
> + if (!avc_operation_has_perm(od, cmd,
> + OPERATION_AUDITALLOW))
> + audited &= ~requested;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + *deniedp = denied;
> + return audited;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int avc_operation_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
> + u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd,
> + struct operation_decision *od,
> + u16 cmd, int result,
> + struct common_audit_data *ad)
> +{
> + u32 audited, denied;
> +
> + audited = avc_operation_audit_required(
> + requested, avd, od, cmd, result, &denied);
> + if (likely(!audited))
> + return 0;
> + return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
> + audited, denied, result, ad, 0);
> +}
> +
> static void avc_node_free(struct rcu_head *rhead)
> {
> struct avc_node *node = container_of(rhead, struct avc_node, rhead);
> + avc_operation_free(node->ae.ops_node);
> kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
> avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
> }
> @@ -221,6 +508,7 @@ static void avc_node_delete(struct avc_node *node)
>
> static void avc_node_kill(struct avc_node *node)
> {
> + avc_operation_free(node->ae.ops_node);
> kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
> avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
> atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
> @@ -367,6 +655,7 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert)
> * @tsid: target security identifier
> * @tclass: target security class
> * @avd: resulting av decision
> + * @ops: resulting operation decisions
> *
> * Insert an AVC entry for the SID pair
> * (@ssid, @tsid) and class @tclass.
> @@ -378,7 +667,9 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert)
> * the access vectors into a cache entry, returns
> * avc_node inserted. Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
> */
> -static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
> +static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
> + struct av_decision *avd,
> + struct avc_operation_node *ops_node)
> {
> struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL;
> int hvalue;
> @@ -391,10 +682,15 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_dec
> if (node) {
> struct hlist_head *head;
> spinlock_t *lock;
> + int rc = 0;
>
> hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
> avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
> -
> + rc = avc_operation_populate(node, ops_node);
> + if (rc) {
> + kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
> + return NULL;
> + }
> head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
> lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
>
> @@ -523,14 +819,17 @@ out:
> * @perms : Permission mask bits
> * @ssid,@tsid,@tclass : identifier of an AVC entry
> * @seqno : sequence number when decision was made
> + * @od: operation_decision to be added to the node
> *
> * if a valid AVC entry doesn't exist,this function returns -ENOENT.
> * if kmalloc() called internal returns NULL, this function returns -ENOMEM.
> * otherwise, this function updates the AVC entry. The original AVC-entry object
> * will release later by RCU.
> */
> -static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
> - u32 seqno)
> +static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u16 cmd, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> + u16 tclass, u32 seqno,
> + struct operation_decision *od,
> + u32 flags)
> {
> int hvalue, rc = 0;
> unsigned long flag;
> @@ -574,9 +873,19 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
>
> avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, &orig->ae.avd);
>
> + if (orig->ae.ops_node) {
> + rc = avc_operation_populate(node, orig->ae.ops_node);
> + if (rc) {
> + kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
> + goto out_unlock;
> + }
> + }
> +
> switch (event) {
> case AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT:
> node->ae.avd.allowed |= perms;
> + if (node->ae.ops_node && (flags & AVC_OPERATION_CMD))
> + avc_operation_allow_perm(node->ae.ops_node, cmd);
> break;
> case AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE:
> case AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE:
> @@ -594,6 +903,9 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
> case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE:
> node->ae.avd.auditdeny &= ~perms;
> break;
> + case AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_OPERATION:
> + avc_add_operation(node, od);
> + break;
> }
> avc_node_replace(node, orig);
> out_unlock:
> @@ -665,18 +977,20 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
> * results in a bigger stack frame.
> */
> static noinline struct avc_node *avc_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> - u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
> + u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
> + struct avc_operation_node *ops_node)
> {
> rcu_read_unlock();
> - security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ops_node->od_head);
> + security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &ops_node->ops);
> rcu_read_lock();
> - return avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
> + return avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, ops_node);
> }
>
> static noinline int avc_denied(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> - u16 tclass, u32 requested,
> - unsigned flags,
> - struct av_decision *avd)
> + u16 tclass, u32 requested,
> + u16 cmd, unsigned flags,
> + struct av_decision *avd)
> {
> if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
> return -EACCES;
> @@ -684,11 +998,92 @@ static noinline int avc_denied(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> if (selinux_enforcing && !(avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))
> return -EACCES;
>
> - avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, ssid,
> - tsid, tclass, avd->seqno);
> + avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, cmd, ssid,
> + tsid, tclass, avd->seqno, NULL, flags);
> return 0;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * ioctl commands are comprised of four fields, direction, size, type, and
> + * number. The avc operation logic filters based on two of them:
> + *
> + * type: or code, typically unique to each driver
> + * number: or function
> + *
> + * For example, 0x89 is a socket type, and number 0x27 is the get hardware
> + * address function.
> + */
> +int avc_has_operation(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
> + u16 cmd, struct common_audit_data *ad)
> +{
> + struct avc_node *node;
> + struct av_decision avd;
> + u32 denied;
> + struct operation_decision *od = NULL;
> + struct operation_decision od_local;
> + struct operation_perm allowed;
> + struct operation_perm auditallow;
> + struct operation_perm dontaudit;
> + struct avc_operation_node local_ops_node;
> + struct avc_operation_node *ops_node;
> + u8 type = cmd >> 8;
> + int rc = 0, rc2;
> +
> + ops_node = &local_ops_node;
> + BUG_ON(!requested);
> +
> + rcu_read_lock();
> +
> + node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
> + if (unlikely(!node)) {
> + node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd, ops_node);
> + } else {
> + memcpy(&avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(avd));
> + ops_node = node->ae.ops_node;
> + }
> + /* if operations are not defined, only consider av_decision */
> + if (!ops_node || !ops_node->ops.len)
> + goto decision;
> +
> + od_local.allowed = &allowed;
> + od_local.auditallow = &auditallow;
> + od_local.dontaudit = &dontaudit;
> +
> + /* lookup operation decision */
> + od = avc_operation_lookup(type, ops_node);
> + if (unlikely(!od)) {
> + /* Compute operation decision if type is flagged */
> + if (!security_operation_test(ops_node->ops.type, type)) {
> + avd.allowed &= ~requested;
> + goto decision;
> + }
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> + security_compute_operation(ssid, tsid, tclass, type, &od_local);
> + rcu_read_lock();
> + avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_OPERATION, requested, cmd,
> + ssid, tsid, tclass, avd.seqno, &od_local, 0);
> + } else {
> + avc_quick_copy_operation_decision(cmd, &od_local, od);
> + }
> + od = &od_local;
> +
> + if (!avc_operation_has_perm(od, cmd, OPERATION_ALLOWED))
> + avd.allowed &= ~requested;
> +
> +decision:
> + denied = requested & ~(avd.allowed);
> + if (unlikely(denied))
> + rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, cmd,
> + AVC_OPERATION_CMD, &avd);
> +
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> + rc2 = avc_operation_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
> + &avd, od, cmd, rc, ad);
> + if (rc2)
> + return rc2;
> + return rc;
> +}
>
> /**
> * avc_has_perm_noaudit - Check permissions but perform no auditing.
> @@ -716,6 +1111,7 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> struct av_decision *avd)
> {
> struct avc_node *node;
> + struct avc_operation_node ops_node;
> int rc = 0;
> u32 denied;
>
> @@ -725,13 +1121,13 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
>
> node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
> if (unlikely(!node))
> - node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
> + node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &ops_node);
> else
> memcpy(avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*avd));
>
> denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed);
> if (unlikely(denied))
> - rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, flags, avd);
> + rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, flags, avd);
>
> rcu_read_unlock();
> return rc;
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 4d1a541..0fe64bb 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -3239,6 +3239,44 @@ static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
> file_free_security(file);
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
> + * operation to an inode.
> + */
> +int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
> + u32 requested, u16 cmd)
> +{
> + struct common_audit_data ad;
> + struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
> + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
> + struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
> + struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
> + u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
> + int rc;
> +
> + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
> + ad.u.op = &ioctl;
> + ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
> + ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
> +
> + if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
> + rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, fsec->sid,
> + SECCLASS_FD,
> + FD__USE,
> + &ad);
> + if (rc)
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
> + return 0;
> +
> + rc = avc_has_operation(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
> + requested, cmd, &ad);
> +out:
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
> unsigned long arg)
> {
> @@ -3281,7 +3319,7 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
> * to the file's ioctl() function.
> */
> default:
> - error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
> + error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
> }
> return error;
> }
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
> index ddf8eec..3165d4e 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
> @@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> }
>
> #define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
> +#define AVC_OPERATION_CMD 2 /* ignore command when updating operations */
> int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> u16 tclass, u32 requested,
> unsigned flags,
> @@ -151,6 +152,9 @@ int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> u16 tclass, u32 requested,
> struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
>
> +int avc_has_operation(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
> + u16 cmd, struct common_audit_data *ad);
> +
> u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
>
> #define AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT 1
> @@ -161,6 +165,7 @@ u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
> #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE 32
> #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE 64
> #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE 128
> +#define AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_OPERATION 256
>
> int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events);
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
> index d1e0b23..9f4f7cb 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
> @@ -35,13 +35,14 @@
> #define POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS 27
> #define POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE 28
> #define POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES 29
> +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_IOCTL_OPERATIONS 30
>
> /* Range of policy versions we understand*/
> #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
> #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
> #else
> -#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES
> +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_IOCTL_OPERATIONS
> #endif
>
> /* Mask for just the mount related flags */
> @@ -108,11 +109,40 @@ struct av_decision {
> u32 flags;
> };
>
> +#define security_operation_set(perms, x) (perms[x >> 5] |= 1 << (x & 0x1f))
> +#define security_operation_test(perms, x) (1 & (perms[x >> 5] >> (x & 0x1f)))
> +
> +struct operation_perm {
> + u32 perms[8];
> +};
> +
> +struct operation_decision {
> + u8 type;
> + u8 specified;
> + struct operation_perm *allowed;
> + struct operation_perm *auditallow;
> + struct operation_perm *dontaudit;
> +};
> +
> +#define OPERATION_ALLOWED 1
> +#define OPERATION_AUDITALLOW 2
> +#define OPERATION_DONTAUDIT 4
> +#define OPERATION_ALL (OPERATION_ALLOWED | OPERATION_AUDITALLOW |\
> + OPERATION_DONTAUDIT)
> +struct operation {
> + u16 len; /* length of operation decision chain */
> + u32 type[8]; /* 256 types */
> +};
> +
> /* definitions of av_decision.flags */
> #define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE 0x0001
>
> void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> - u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
> + u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
> + struct operation *ops);
> +
> +void security_compute_operation(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
> + u8 type, struct operation_decision *od);
>
> void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
> index b64f277..40397c5 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
> #include "policydb.h"
>
> static struct kmem_cache *avtab_node_cachep;
> +static struct kmem_cache *avtab_operation_cachep;
>
> /* Based on MurmurHash3, written by Austin Appleby and placed in the
> * public domain.
> @@ -70,11 +71,24 @@ avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, int hvalue,
> struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum)
> {
> struct avtab_node *newnode;
> + struct avtab_operation *ops;
> newnode = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
> if (newnode == NULL)
> return NULL;
> newnode->key = *key;
> - newnode->datum = *datum;
> +
> + if (key->specified & AVTAB_OP) {
> + ops = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_operation_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (ops == NULL) {
> + kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, newnode);
> + return NULL;
> + }
> + *ops = *(datum->u.ops);
> + newnode->datum.u.ops = ops;
> + } else {
> + newnode->datum.u.data = datum->u.data;
> + }
> +
> if (prev) {
> newnode->next = prev->next;
> prev->next = newnode;
> @@ -107,8 +121,11 @@ static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_dat
> if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
> key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
> key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
> - (specified & cur->key.specified))
> + (specified & cur->key.specified)) {
> + if (specified & AVTAB_OPNUM)
> + break;
> return -EEXIST;
> + }
> if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
> break;
> if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
> @@ -271,6 +288,9 @@ void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h)
> while (cur) {
> temp = cur;
> cur = cur->next;
> + if (temp->key.specified & AVTAB_OP)
> + kmem_cache_free(avtab_operation_cachep,
> + temp->datum.u.ops);
> kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, temp);
> }
> }
> @@ -359,7 +379,13 @@ static uint16_t spec_order[] = {
> AVTAB_AUDITALLOW,
> AVTAB_TRANSITION,
> AVTAB_CHANGE,
> - AVTAB_MEMBER
> + AVTAB_MEMBER,
> + AVTAB_OPNUM_ALLOWED,
> + AVTAB_OPNUM_AUDITALLOW,
> + AVTAB_OPNUM_DONTAUDIT,
> + AVTAB_OPTYPE_ALLOWED,
> + AVTAB_OPTYPE_AUDITALLOW,
> + AVTAB_OPTYPE_DONTAUDIT
> };
>
> int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
> @@ -369,10 +395,11 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
> {
> __le16 buf16[4];
> u16 enabled;
> - __le32 buf32[7];
> u32 items, items2, val, vers = pol->policyvers;
> struct avtab_key key;
> struct avtab_datum datum;
> + struct avtab_operation ops;
> + __le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(ops.op.perms)];
> int i, rc;
> unsigned set;
>
> @@ -429,11 +456,15 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
> printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n");
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> + if (val & AVTAB_OP) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry has operations\n");
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
>
> for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
> if (val & spec_order[i]) {
> key.specified = spec_order[i] | enabled;
> - datum.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
> + datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
> rc = insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
> if (rc)
> return rc;
> @@ -452,7 +483,6 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
> printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
> return rc;
> }
> -
> items = 0;
> key.source_type = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
> key.target_type = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
> @@ -476,14 +506,32 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
> return -EINVAL;
> }
>
> - rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
> - if (rc) {
> - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
> - return rc;
> + if ((vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_IOCTL_OPERATIONS)
> + || !(key.specified & AVTAB_OP)) {
> + rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
> + if (rc) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
> + return rc;
> + }
> + datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
> + } else {
> + memset(&ops, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_operation));
> + rc = next_entry(&ops.type, fp, sizeof(u8));
> + if (rc) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
> + return rc;
> + }
> + rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*ARRAY_SIZE(ops.op.perms));
> + if (rc) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
> + return rc;
> + }
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ops.op.perms); i++)
> + ops.op.perms[i] = le32_to_cpu(buf32[i]);
> + datum.u.ops = &ops;
> }
> - datum.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
> if ((key.specified & AVTAB_TYPE) &&
> - !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.data)) {
> + !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.u.data)) {
> printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: invalid type\n");
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> @@ -543,8 +591,9 @@ bad:
> int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
> {
> __le16 buf16[4];
> - __le32 buf32[1];
> + __le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.ops->op.perms)];
> int rc;
> + unsigned int i;
>
> buf16[0] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.source_type);
> buf16[1] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.target_type);
> @@ -553,8 +602,19 @@ int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
> rc = put_entry(buf16, sizeof(u16), 4, fp);
> if (rc)
> return rc;
> - buf32[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.data);
> - rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
> +
> + if (cur->key.specified & AVTAB_OP) {
> + rc = put_entry(&cur->datum.u.ops->type, sizeof(u8), 1, fp);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.ops->op.perms); i++)
> + buf32[i] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.ops->op.perms[i]);
> + rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32),
> + ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.ops->op.perms), fp);
> + } else {
> + buf32[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.data);
> + rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
> + }
> if (rc)
> return rc;
> return 0;
> @@ -588,9 +648,13 @@ void avtab_cache_init(void)
> avtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_node",
> sizeof(struct avtab_node),
> 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
> + avtab_operation_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_operation",
> + sizeof(struct avtab_operation),
> + 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
> }
>
> void avtab_cache_destroy(void)
> {
> kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_node_cachep);
> + kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_operation_cachep);
> }
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
> index adb451c..0a8be63e 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
> @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@
>
> #include <linux/flex_array.h>
>
> +#include "security.h"
> +
> struct avtab_key {
> u16 source_type; /* source type */
> u16 target_type; /* target type */
> @@ -37,13 +39,34 @@ struct avtab_key {
> #define AVTAB_MEMBER 0x0020
> #define AVTAB_CHANGE 0x0040
> #define AVTAB_TYPE (AVTAB_TRANSITION | AVTAB_MEMBER | AVTAB_CHANGE)
> +#define AVTAB_OPNUM_ALLOWED 0x0100
> +#define AVTAB_OPNUM_AUDITALLOW 0x0200
> +#define AVTAB_OPNUM_DONTAUDIT 0x0400
> +#define AVTAB_OPNUM (AVTAB_OPNUM_ALLOWED | \
> + AVTAB_OPNUM_AUDITALLOW | \
> + AVTAB_OPNUM_DONTAUDIT)
> +#define AVTAB_OPTYPE_ALLOWED 0x1000
> +#define AVTAB_OPTYPE_AUDITALLOW 0x2000
> +#define AVTAB_OPTYPE_DONTAUDIT 0x4000
> +#define AVTAB_OPTYPE (AVTAB_OPTYPE_ALLOWED | \
> + AVTAB_OPTYPE_AUDITALLOW | \
> + AVTAB_OPTYPE_DONTAUDIT)
> +#define AVTAB_OP (AVTAB_OPNUM | AVTAB_OPTYPE)
> #define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD 0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
> #define AVTAB_ENABLED 0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
> u16 specified; /* what field is specified */
> };
>
> +struct avtab_operation {
> + u8 type;
> + struct operation_perm op;
> +};
> +
> struct avtab_datum {
> - u32 data; /* access vector or type value */
> + union {
> + u32 data; /* access vector or type value */
> + struct avtab_operation *ops; /* ioctl operations */
> + } u;
> };
>
> struct avtab_node {
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
> index 62c6773..c4cd20a 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
>
> #include "security.h"
> #include "conditional.h"
> +#include "services.h"
>
> /*
> * cond_evaluate_expr evaluates a conditional expr
> @@ -612,21 +613,39 @@ int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *list, void *fp)
>
> return 0;
> }
> +
> +void cond_compute_operation(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
> + struct operation_decision *od)
> +{
> + struct avtab_node *node;
> +
> + if (!ctab || !key || !od)
> + return;
> +
> + for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
> + node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
> + if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED)
> + services_compute_operation_num(od, node);
> + }
> + return;
> +
> +}
> /* Determine whether additional permissions are granted by the conditional
> * av table, and if so, add them to the result
> */
> -void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decision *avd)
> +void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
> + struct av_decision *avd, struct operation *ops)
> {
> struct avtab_node *node;
>
> - if (!ctab || !key || !avd)
> + if (!ctab || !key || !avd || !ops)
> return;
>
> for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
> node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
> if ((u16)(AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
> (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
> - avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
> + avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
> if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
> (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
> /* Since a '0' in an auditdeny mask represents a
> @@ -634,10 +653,13 @@ void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decisi
> * the '&' operand to ensure that all '0's in the mask
> * are retained (much unlike the allow and auditallow cases).
> */
> - avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.data;
> + avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
> if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
> (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
> - avd->auditallow |= node->datum.data;
> + avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
> + if ((node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) &&
> + (node->key.specified & AVTAB_OP))
> + services_compute_operation_type(ops, node);
> }
> return;
> }
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
> index 4d1f874..80ee2bb 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
> @@ -73,8 +73,10 @@ int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
> int cond_write_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *ptr);
> int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *list, void *fp);
>
> -void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decision *avd);
> -
> +void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
> + struct av_decision *avd, struct operation *ops);
> +void cond_compute_operation(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
> + struct operation_decision *od);
> int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node);
>
> #endif /* _CONDITIONAL_H_ */
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> index 74aa224..68ffbda 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> @@ -148,6 +148,11 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
> .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
> .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
> },
> + {
> + .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_IOCTL_OPERATIONS,
> + .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
> + .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
> + },
> };
>
> static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> index 9e2d820..d8d966f 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> @@ -93,9 +93,10 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
> u32 *scontext_len);
>
> static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
> - struct context *tcontext,
> - u16 tclass,
> - struct av_decision *avd);
> + struct context *tcontext,
> + u16 tclass,
> + struct av_decision *avd,
> + struct operation *ops);
>
> struct selinux_mapping {
> u16 value; /* policy value */
> @@ -565,7 +566,8 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
> context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
> tcontext,
> tclass,
> - &lo_avd);
> + &lo_avd,
> + NULL);
> if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
> return; /* no masked permission */
> masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
> @@ -580,7 +582,8 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
> context_struct_compute_av(scontext,
> &lo_tcontext,
> tclass,
> - &lo_avd);
> + &lo_avd,
> + NULL);
> if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
> return; /* no masked permission */
> masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
> @@ -596,7 +599,8 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
> context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
> &lo_tcontext,
> tclass,
> - &lo_avd);
> + &lo_avd,
> + NULL);
> if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
> return; /* no masked permission */
> masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
> @@ -612,14 +616,39 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
> }
> }
>
> +/* flag ioctl types that have operation permissions */
> +void services_compute_operation_type(
> + struct operation *ops,
> + struct avtab_node *node)
> +{
> + u8 type;
> + unsigned int i;
> +
> + if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_OPTYPE) {
> + /* if allowing one or more complete types */
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ops->type); i++)
> + ops->type[i] |= node->datum.u.ops->op.perms[i];
> + } else {
> + /* if allowing operations within a type */
> + type = node->datum.u.ops->type;
> + security_operation_set(ops->type, type);
> + }
> +
> + /* If no ioctl commands are allowed, ignore auditallow and auditdeny */
> + if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_OPTYPE_ALLOWED ||
> + node->key.specified & AVTAB_OPNUM_ALLOWED)
> + ops->len = 1;
> +}
> +
> /*
> - * Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for
> - * the permissions in a particular class.
> + * Compute access vectors and operations ranges based on a context
> + * structure pair for the permissions in a particular class.
> */
> static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
> - struct context *tcontext,
> - u16 tclass,
> - struct av_decision *avd)
> + struct context *tcontext,
> + u16 tclass,
> + struct av_decision *avd,
> + struct operation *ops)
> {
> struct constraint_node *constraint;
> struct role_allow *ra;
> @@ -633,6 +662,10 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
> avd->allowed = 0;
> avd->auditallow = 0;
> avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
> + if (ops) {
> + memset(&ops->type, 0, sizeof(ops->type));
> + ops->len = 0;
> + }
>
> if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
> if (printk_ratelimit())
> @@ -647,7 +680,7 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
> * this permission check, then use it.
> */
> avkey.target_class = tclass;
> - avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV;
> + avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_OP;
> sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, scontext->type - 1);
> BUG_ON(!sattr);
> tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, tcontext->type - 1);
> @@ -660,15 +693,17 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
> node;
> node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
> if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
> - avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
> + avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
> else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
> - avd->auditallow |= node->datum.data;
> + avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
> else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
> - avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.data;
> + avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
> + else if (ops && (node->key.specified & AVTAB_OP))
> + services_compute_operation_type(ops, node);
> }
>
> /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
> - cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, avd);
> + cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, avd, ops);
>
> }
> }
> @@ -899,13 +934,138 @@ static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
> avd->flags = 0;
> }
>
> +void services_compute_operation_num(struct operation_decision *od,
> + struct avtab_node *node)
> +{
> + unsigned int i;
>
> + if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_OPNUM) {
> + if (od->type != node->datum.u.ops->type)
> + return;
> + } else {
> + if (!security_operation_test(node->datum.u.ops->op.perms,
> + od->type))
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_OPTYPE_ALLOWED) {
> + od->specified |= OPERATION_ALLOWED;
> + memset(od->allowed->perms, 0xff,
> + sizeof(od->allowed->perms));
> + } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_OPTYPE_AUDITALLOW) {
> + od->specified |= OPERATION_AUDITALLOW;
> + memset(od->auditallow->perms, 0xff,
> + sizeof(od->auditallow->perms));
> + } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_OPTYPE_DONTAUDIT) {
> + od->specified |= OPERATION_DONTAUDIT;
> + memset(od->dontaudit->perms, 0xff,
> + sizeof(od->dontaudit->perms));
> + } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_OPNUM_ALLOWED) {
> + od->specified |= OPERATION_ALLOWED;
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(od->allowed->perms); i++)
> + od->allowed->perms[i] |=
> + node->datum.u.ops->op.perms[i];
> + } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_OPNUM_AUDITALLOW) {
> + od->specified |= OPERATION_AUDITALLOW;
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(od->auditallow->perms); i++)
> + od->auditallow->perms[i] |=
> + node->datum.u.ops->op.perms[i];
> + } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_OPNUM_DONTAUDIT) {
> + od->specified |= OPERATION_DONTAUDIT;
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(od->dontaudit->perms); i++)
> + od->dontaudit->perms[i] |=
> + node->datum.u.ops->op.perms[i];
> + } else {
> + BUG();
> + }
> +}
> +
> +void security_compute_operation(u32 ssid,
> + u32 tsid,
> + u16 orig_tclass,
> + u8 type,
> + struct operation_decision *od)
> +{
> + u16 tclass;
> + struct context *scontext, *tcontext;
> + struct avtab_key avkey;
> + struct avtab_node *node;
> + struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
> + struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
> + unsigned int i, j;
> +
> + od->type = type;
> + od->specified = 0;
> + memset(od->allowed->perms, 0, sizeof(od->allowed->perms));
> + memset(od->auditallow->perms, 0, sizeof(od->auditallow->perms));
> + memset(od->dontaudit->perms, 0, sizeof(od->dontaudit->perms));
> +
> + read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
> + if (!ss_initialized)
> + goto allow;
> +
> + scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
> + if (!scontext) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
> + __func__, ssid);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
> + if (!tcontext) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
> + __func__, tsid);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
> + if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
> + if (policydb.allow_unknown)
> + goto allow;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> +
> + if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
> + pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + avkey.target_class = tclass;
> + avkey.specified = AVTAB_OP;
> + sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
> + scontext->type - 1);
> + BUG_ON(!sattr);
> + tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
> + tcontext->type - 1);
> + BUG_ON(!tattr);
> + ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
> + ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
> + avkey.source_type = i + 1;
> + avkey.target_type = j + 1;
> + for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
> + node;
> + node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified))
> + services_compute_operation_num(od, node);
> +
> + cond_compute_operation(&policydb.te_cond_avtab,
> + &avkey, od);
> + }
> + }
> +out:
> + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
> + return;
> +allow:
> + memset(od->allowed->perms, 0xff, sizeof(od->allowed->perms));
> + goto out;
> +}
> /**
> * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
> * @ssid: source security identifier
> * @tsid: target security identifier
> * @tclass: target security class
> * @avd: access vector decisions
> + * @od: operation decisions
> *
> * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
> * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
> @@ -913,13 +1073,15 @@ static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
> void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
> u32 tsid,
> u16 orig_tclass,
> - struct av_decision *avd)
> + struct av_decision *avd,
> + struct operation *ops)
> {
> u16 tclass;
> struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
>
> read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
> avd_init(avd);
> + ops->len = 0;
> if (!ss_initialized)
> goto allow;
>
> @@ -947,7 +1109,7 @@ void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
> goto allow;
> goto out;
> }
> - context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
> + context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, ops);
> map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);
> out:
> read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
> @@ -993,7 +1155,7 @@ void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
> goto out;
> }
>
> - context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
> + context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, NULL);
> out:
> read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
> return;
> @@ -1515,7 +1677,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
>
> if (avdatum) {
> /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
> - newcontext.type = avdatum->data;
> + newcontext.type = avdatum->u.data;
> }
>
> /* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
> index e8d907e..5697574 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
> @@ -11,5 +11,11 @@
>
> extern struct policydb policydb;
>
> +void services_compute_operation_type(struct operation *ops,
> + struct avtab_node *node);
> +
> +void services_compute_operation_num(struct operation_decision *od,
> + struct avtab_node *node);
> +
> #endif /* _SS_SERVICES_H_ */
>
>
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