Re: user_r/sysadm_r/staff_r/unconfined_r

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We could use the seuser and/or MCS fields to restrict running the programs that enter the domains in question. 

Also now it's an issue of systemd access which changes things a bit, I haven't looked into this yet.

On November 5, 2014 12:31:48 AM GMT+11:00, Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>On Nov 4, 2014 12:46 PM, "Russell Coker" <russell@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> The role separation seems to give no benefit apart from
>sysadm_r/unconfined_r given that we have seuser based constraints and
>MCS
>labels to separate users and that they all use the same types.
>
>I disagree. Roles allow for restricting the domains that users can
>transition into. I use them often for granting users "limited root".
>For
>instance dbadm_r for DBAs versus webadm_r for web app server admins.
>
>Wkr,
>  Sven Vermeulen
>
>
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