Re: Fwd: Booting time is increased after applying kernel 3.10

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On 06/27/2014 08:15 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 06/26/2014 10:17 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Thursday, June 26, 2014 09:57:57 AM Stephen Smalley wrote:
>>> On 06/25/2014 03:49 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>>>> I suspect it won't matter in practice, but the reason for it is that
>>>> permissions or other state may have been cached during bootup prior to
>>>> initial policy load that may no longer be valid.
>>
>> ...
>>
>>> So I am not sure we can safely remove the avc_ss_reset() from initial
>>> policy load in the mainline kernel, as we are not guaranteed that there
>>> is no network interface configuration prior to initial policy load and
>>> we are not guaranteed that there will be a setenforce 1.  It would
>>> perhaps be better there to instead just avoid calling synchronize_net
>>> altogether if possible or only call it once for the entire avc_ss_reset,
>>> not on each of the netif/node/port callbacks.
>>
>> When I took a quick glance at this briefly yesterday one of the things that 
>> crossed my mind was exporting the different netif/node/port flush functions 
>> and grouping the callbacks into a single callback that calls each of the flush 
>> functions and then synchronize_net() once at the end; similar to what you 
>> describe above.  Perhaps that is the best solution upstream.
>>
>> Unless someone else wants to develop/test a patch, I'll put one together.
> 
> Did you confirm that we need the synchronize_net() call at all?

Let me phrase this differently:

1) Does the synchronize_net() call guarantee that after the policy load
completes (or more specifically, after the avc_ss_reset completes), all
subsequent network permission checks will be based on the
netif/node/port contexts defined by the new policy and not based on the
old ones?

-and-

2) Does anyone currently rely on this behavior, i.e. they make a change
to the netif/node/port contexts in policy, load the new policy, and need
to know that the new context assignments are being applied on every
network operation before they can proceed safely?


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