On 03/13/2014 07:00 PM, Paul Moore wrote: > On Thursday, March 13, 2014 12:34:36 PM Stephen Smalley wrote: >> I guess I don't understand the original problem or fix then. I assumed >> that cred->security was referring to one set of credentials while >> current_security() was referring to another and you wanted to use the >> latter instead of the former. If not, then none of this makes any >> sense. Transitions are for computing new labels from a pair of labels, >> either by allowing selection of either subject or object or by deriving >> a new label from the two. If there is only one label in view and the >> other is always fixed (kernel), then under what conditions are you going >> to label some keys with the kernel domain and why does that make any >> sense at all? It was still allocated by some userspace process and >> ought to carry along the credentials of that process. > > If we ignore setkeycreatecon() for a moment, keys are always created with the > label of the process that creates them, this is normal and expected. The > issue arises when several different processes, each with a different label, > need to update/modify the same key; there is a race-like condition where the > security label for a key could change depending on which process "won" and > created the key. This unpredictability is causing the policy writers a > headache as they try to craft policy that isn't overly permissive when it > comes to the keyring. > > One example taken from a problem report: > > "Right now keys created in the kernel are done so with the label > of the creating process. That means that if sssd adds a key to > be used by the user all user types must be able to read sssd_t > keys. If they want to use kinit to update the key, now all user > types must be able to write to sssd_t keys." > >> The SELinux key/keyring model was designed quite a while ago and vetted >> by the keys/keyrings maintainer, so I'd be careful about any changes >> without careful consideration and review by the keys maintainer (David >> Howells). It is also documented in Documentation/security/keys.txt. > > You are right, I should have CC'd David on the posting, I'll do that for v2. > > As for the documentation, I'll update it in the v2 patch to mention the > proposed transition mechanism. As it stands right now I don't see a major > issue with this proposal so long as we ensure that the default behavior > matches what is seen on systems today. No, we need to understand the model you are proposing first before we discuss the code. Currently, we label keys based on creator unless using setkeycreatecon(), same as sockets. With sockets though there is a special case for kernel-internal sockets where those are labeled with the kernel domain and exempted, but those are never exposed directly to userspace. How do you envision labeling keys? Will some keys still be labeled with the creator's domain, and others with the kernel domain? Which ones get labeled which way? And if you have to allow everyone to write to the kernel domain labeled keys, then how are you helping prevent the very problem you described, i.e. you are still introducing a globally-writable type in the policy (unconstrained sharing, potential for misuse of a key intended for another). _______________________________________________ Selinux mailing list Selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxx. To get help, send an email containing "help" to Selinux-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxx.
