On 03/07/2014 04:22 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Tuesday, March 04, 2014 01:26:24 PM Nikolay Aleksandrov wrote:
>> security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the
>> allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the
>> callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument
>> needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct
>> security_operations and to the internal function
>> selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic
>> callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest.
>> The path that needed the gfp argument addition is:
>> security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security ->
>> all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) ->
>> selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only)
>>
>> CC: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> CC: Dave Jones <davej@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>> CC: Fan Du <fan.du@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> CC: David S. Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> CC: LSM list <linux-security-module@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@xxxxxxxxxx>
>
> [NOTE: added the SELinux list to the CC list above]
>
> In general, the patch is pretty simple with the obvious necessary changes,
> just one gotcha, see below.
>
Thanks, I'll add the SELinux list to the CCs next time.
>> diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
>> index 0462cb3ff0a7..7ae773f4fe38 100644
>> --- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
>> +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
>> @@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct
>> xfrm_state *x) * xfrm_user_sec_ctx context.
>> */
>> static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
>> - struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
>> + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
>> + gfp_t gfp)
>> {
>> int rc;
>> const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
>> @@ -94,7 +95,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx
>> **ctxp, if (str_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
>> return -ENOMEM;
>>
>> - ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>> + ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len + 1, gfp);
>> if (!ctx)
>> return -ENOMEM;
>
> Also located in selinux_xfrm_alloc_user() is a call to
> security_context_to_sid() which calls security_context_to_sid_core() which in
> some cases does allocate memory. The good news is that to_sid_core() does
> accept a gfp_t flag, the bad news is that to_sid() always passes GFP_KERNEL.
>
> It looks like we need to extend this patch a bit, or add another. Sorry about
> that. If you're getting tired of playing with the LSM/SELinux code let me
> know :)
>
Ah, right. I didn't follow all the paths, I'll fix up this patch and submit
a v2.
Thanks for the review,
Nik
>> @@ -282,9 +283,10 @@ int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
>> * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to
>> xfrm_policy. */
>> int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
>> - struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
>> + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
>> + gfp_t gfp)
>> {
>> - return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(ctxp, uctx);
>> + return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(ctxp, uctx, gfp);
>> }
>>
>> /*
>> @@ -332,7 +334,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
>> int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
>> struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
>> {
>> - return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(&x->security, uctx);
>> + return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(&x->security, uctx, GFP_KERNEL);
>> }
>>
>> /*
>
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