Re: Clarification of labeled IPsec checks

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On Friday, May 03, 2013 03:11:48 PM Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> I'm doing some spring cleaning on refpolicy, cleaning out some old
> unused/unnecessary networking permissions.  I'm trying to make sure I have
> the permissions checks straight, since labeled networking isn't common use.
>  For labeled IPsec, we have the following permissions (assuming all policy
> capabilities are on--assume maximum checks):
> 
> netif: ingress/egress
> node: sendto/recvfrom
> peer: recv
> association: sendto/recvfrom
> 
> I'm told that association perms are checked in the following cases:
> 
> sendto: when a packet leaves the box (legacy only) and when a SA/flow is
> checked recvfrom: when an incoming packet is queued on a socket (legacy
> only)
> 
> Does "legacy only" mean the checks will eventually go away, or is it for a
> legacy IPsec configuration?

In this case "legacy" refers to a SELinux policy that doesn't have the netpeer 
policy capability enabled.

It has been a while since we introduced the netpeer policy capability so I 
imagine we could start a process of deprecating policies that don't enable it.  
We could dump a warning message if someone loads a policy with the netpeer 
capability disabled and then after a few releases (how many?) we could remove 
the legacy bits from the kernel and reject policies which don't have the 
netpeer capability set.

Thoughts?

-- 
paul moore
security and virtualization @ redhat


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