Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devices

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On Wednesday, December 05, 2012 10:01:31 PM Jason Wang wrote:
> On Wednesday, December 05, 2012 01:44:55 PM Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > On Wed, Dec 05, 2012 at 02:19:22PM +0800, Jason Wang wrote:
> > > On 12/05/2012 02:17 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > > On Tuesday, December 04, 2012 07:36:26 PM Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > >> On Tue, Dec 04, 2012 at 11:18:57AM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > >>> Okay, based on your explanation of TUNSETQUEUE, the steps below are
> > > >>> what I
> > > >>> believe we need to do ... if you disagree speak up quickly please.
> > > >>> 
> > > >>> A. TUNSETIFF (new, non-persistent device)
> > > >>> 
> > > >>> [Allocate and initialize the tun_struct LSM state based on the
> > > >>> calling
> > > >>> process, use this state to label the TUN socket.]
> > > >>> 
> > > >>> 1. Call security_tun_dev_create() which authorizes the action.
> > > >>> 2. Call security_tun_dev_alloc_security() which allocates the
> > > >>> tun_struct
> > > >>> LSM blob and SELinux sets some internal blob state to record the
> > > >>> label
> > > >>> of
> > > >>> the calling process.
> > > >>> 3. Call security_tun_dev_attach() which sets the label of the TUN
> > > >>> socket
> > > >>> to match the label stored in the tun_struct LSM blob during A2.  No
> > > >>> authorization is done at this point since the socket is
> > > >>> new/unlabeled.
> > > >>> 
> > > >>> B. TUNSETIFF (existing, persistent device)
> > > >>> 
> > > >>> [Relabel the existing tun_struct LSM state based on the calling
> > > >>> process,
> > > >>> use this state to label the TUN socket.]
> > > >>> 
> > > >>> 1. Attempt to relabel/reset the tun_struct LSM blob from the
> > > >>> currently
> > > >>> stored value, set during A2, to the label of the current calling
> > > >>> process.
> > > >>> *** THIS IS NOT CURRENTLY DONE IN THE RFC PATCH ***
> > > >>> 2. Call security_tun_dev_attach() which sets the label of the TUN
> > > >>> socket
> > > >>> to match the label stored in the tun_struct LSM blob during B1. No
> > > >>> authorization is done at this point since the socket is
> > > >>> new/unlabeled.
> > > >>> 
> > > >>> C. TUNSETQUEUE
> > > >>> 
> > > >>> [Use the existing tun_struct LSM state to label the new TUN socket.]
> > > >>> 
> > > >>> 1. Call security_tun_dev_attach() which sets the label of the TUN
> > > >>> socket
> > > >>> to match the label stored in the tun_struct LSM blob set during
> > > >>> either
> > > >>> A2
> > > >>> or B1. No authorization is done at this point since the socket is
> > > >>> new/unlabeled.
> > > >> 
> > > >> Here's what bothers me. libvirt currently opens tun and passes
> > > >> fd to qemu. What would prevent qemu from attaching fd using
> > > >> TUNSETQUEUE
> > > >> to another device it does not own?
> > > > 
> > > > True, assuming all the above is correct and that I'm understanding it
> > > > correctly (Jason?), we should probably add a new SELinux access
> > > > control
> > > > for
> > > > TUNSETQUEUE.
> > > 
> > > Yes, we need make sure qemu can call TUNSETQUEUE for the device it does
> > > not own.
> > 
> > Meaning can *not* call?
> 
> Sorry for not being clear, I mean qemu can call TUNSETQUEUE for the device
> it owns and for the device it does not own, it can't call.

Okay, let me add a access control for TUNSETQUEUE and I'll post an updated 
patchset later today.

-- 
paul moore
security and virtualization @ redhat


--
This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list.
If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx with
the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.


[Index of Archives]     [Selinux Refpolicy]     [Linux SGX]     [Fedora Users]     [Fedora Desktop]     [Yosemite Photos]     [Yosemite Camping]     [Yosemite Campsites]     [KDE Users]     [Gnome Users]

  Powered by Linux