Re: [PATCH 5/5] LSM: SELinux changes to allow LSM stacking

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On 9/6/2012 6:08 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Wed, 2012-09-05 at 10:38 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>> On Tue, 2012-09-04 at 19:09 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> Subject: LSM: SELinux changes to allow LSM stacking
>>>
>>> Change security blob accesses to use the lsm_get/lsm_set
>>> interfaces. This requires removal of the cred pointer
>>> poisoning in selinux_cred_free.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> FWIW, passes the selinux-testsuite with SELinux and Yama enabled.
> However, setting SELINUX=disabled in /etc/selinux/config and rebooting
> with this kernel yields a kernel panic during reset_security_ops(),
> called by selinux_disable().
>

reset_security_ops is only used by SELinux. There are a number of ways
to repair this. The important question is whether a general solution is
required or if it can be left SELinux specific. If it is a general
interface, does it clear all the LSMs or just the LSM calling it?
I would suggest that leaving it to SELinux is the best choice, and
clearing the calling LSM only the next best choice.


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