Re: An MCS policy

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On Tue, Sep 04, 2012 at 10:02:34AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Mon, 2012-09-03 at 19:59 +0200, Ole Kliemann wrote:
> > 01:		( t1 != is_mcsconstrained )
> > 02:	or	( t2 != is_mcsconstrained )
> 
> Not sure if you are using TE to prevent this, but one possible concern
> with using the same invariant for source (t1) and target (t2) is with
> respect to process ptrace, transition, and dyntransition permissions.
> You want to ensure that a MCS constrained process cannot ptrace or
> transition to a MCS-unconstrained domain.

Yes, that's prevented by TE and asserted by neverallow.

> > 03:	or	(	
> > 04:				( l1 domby h1 ) 
> > 05:			and	( l2 domby h2 ) 
> 
> The kernel (mls_context_isvalid() in security/selinux/ss/mls.c)
> guarantees these invariants for all security contexts.cd 

This one I saw coming.

> 
> > 06:			and	( h1 dom h2 ) 
> > 07:			and ( h1 dom l2 ) 
> 
> Redundant.

This one I totally missed. Under the premise of 04 and 05, the 
source high range always dominates the target low range if it 
already dominates the target high range -- it's transitive after 
all.

> 
> > 08:			and ( l1 domby l2 ) 
> > 09:		)

Thanks for having a look!

Ole

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