Re: proof selinux

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



I never said it stops an overflow from occurring, it merely mitigates an attack that was accomplished through an overflow....or similar memory corruption error.

On Aug 28, 2012 9:28 PM, "Patrick K., ITF" <cto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Bill,

The demonstration for SEAndroid you referred to is not to prevent the overflow, SELinux is not a tool such as StackGuard or ProPolice;

Such prevention is in gaining access and elevation of privileges, SELinux is there to compartmentalize things if correctly used, So technically it is not for preventing from buffer overflow or even preventing exploits, it is to confine, isolate, restrict and limit the damage (in GingerBreak case preventing Elevation of access -Root access-)

I believe you referred to this page:

http://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/lss2011_slides/caseforseandroid.pdf

Best Regards,

Patrick K.

On 8/29/2012 12:10 AM, William Roberts wrote:
As far as demo at preventing attacks based on overflow stephen smalley
does a nice job showing how SEAndroid prevented ginger break. Look at
the SEAndroid web page(Google it)

On Aug 28, 2012 8:45 PM, "Patrick K., ITF" <cto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
<mailto:cto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:

    Hi Raul,

    I'm not sure if we are on the same page about SELinux.

    SELinux is not there to prevent from buffer overflow or such exploits,

    If you run a process in some kind of Role or Context, you confine it
    to the limitations you defined in that context (using SELinux Policies),

    How effective SELinux would be, depends on your policies actually.

    The effectiveness of SELinux has nothing to do with exploits, unless
    of course you meant attacking SELinux code or kernel LSM or Kernel
    itself.


    Testing SELinux is easy, simply assign whatever role or policy you
    want to a process and user or group,  the ultimate exploit of a
    process gives total control of that role or policy to that user. So
    the attackers become as privileged as the role or user or context of
    the policy.


    Sincerely,

    Patrick K.

    On 8/28/2012 10:50 PM, Raul da Silva {Sp4wn} wrote:

        hi guys,

        I know that we have a lot of ways to prove how effective is
        SELinux as
        cgi, perl, shell scripts and I know that is effective but I'd
        like to
        know if someone already tested some kind of exploit of buffer
        overflow
        attack as demo to show how effective could be SELinux.
        Any information I really appreciate

        Thanks



        Raul Leite
        sp4wn.root@xxxxxxxxx <mailto:sp4wn.root@xxxxxxxxx>
        <mailto:sp4wn.root@xxxxxxxxx <mailto:sp4wn.root@xxxxxxxxx>>



    --
    This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list.
    If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to
    majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <mailto:majordomo@xxxxxxxxx.gov> with
    the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.


[Index of Archives]     [Selinux Refpolicy]     [Linux SGX]     [Fedora Users]     [Fedora Desktop]     [Yosemite Photos]     [Yosemite Camping]     [Yosemite Campsites]     [KDE Users]     [Gnome Users]

  Powered by Linux