Re: [PATCH 3/3] external/sepolicy: system r/w udp_socket of untrusted apps

[Haiqing Jiang <hqjiang1988@xxxxxxxxx>]

That will be fine. Appdomain is more general. Thanks.

On Mon, Jul 23, 2012 at 6:20 AM, Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On Thu, 2012-07-19 at 14:49 -0700, Haiqing Jiang wrote:
> From: hqjiang <hqjiang1988@xxxxxxxxx>
>
> ---
>  system.te |    3 +++
>  1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/system.te b/system.te
> index a4065cf..5c34f81 100644
> --- a/system.te
> +++ b/system.te
> @@ -196,3 +196,6 @@ allow system domain:file r_file_perms;
>  # to uart driver and ctrl proc entry
>  allow system gps_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
>  allow system gps_control:file rw_file_perms;
> +
> +# system Read/Write udp_socket of untrusted_app
> +allow system untrusted_app:udp_socket { read write };

So an app is passing a socket fd to the system_server over Binder and
the system_server is then writing to the socket?  Wonder why.  Anyway,
rather than writing this only in terms of one app domain
(untrusted_app), cover all cases by using the appdomain attribute, i.e.
allow system appdomain:udp_socket { read write };

--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency

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Haiqing Jiang, PH.D student

Computer Science Department, North Carolina State University