Re: SELinux with initramfs

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On 01/14/2012 10:46 AM, Chris PeBenito wrote:
> On 1/14/2012 9:34 AM, Sven Vermeulen wrote:
>> On Sat, Jan 14, 2012 at 03:20:02PM +0100, Sven Vermeulen wrote:
>>> An initramfs' /init will run in the kernel_t domain (and
>>> unconfined until load_policy is called ?)
>> 
>> Not unconfined, permissive.
> 
> It will run in the kernel initial SID ("kernel") until a policy is 
> loaded.  Before the policy is loaded, it isn't permissive per se,
> as there is nothing to enforce.  SELinux is disabled in the "no
> policy loaded" sense (as opposed to the kernel command line
> selinux=0, unregistered SELinux LSM sense).  Once the policy is
> loaded, all of the labels will be set based on their initial SID;
> thus, the "kernel"-labeled processes get the kernel initial SID in
> the policy, kernel_t, and the initial enforcing/permissive state
> will be set based on the kernel command line enforcing= option,
> /etc/selinux/config, or kernel compiled-in default.
> 
In RHEL and Fedora, we relabel the parts of /dev that are created in
the initramfs and restart udev so it is a child of init/systemd.

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