Re: I am trying an experiment of making allow_ptrace boolean actually do something useful.

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On 10/05/2011 12:16 PM, Eric Paris wrote:
> ps uses /proc/[pid]/stat .
> 
> /proc/pid/stat ouputs things like the last EIP ESP mm->start and
> stop and the stack top IF you have ptrace permissions.  If you
> don't have permissions you just get 0's for those fields.
> 
> see fs/proc/array.c::do_task_stat()
> 
> Should I force some sort of dontaudit all the way down this code
> path?
> 
> -Eric
> 
> On Wed, Oct 5, 2011 at 11:54 AM, Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@xxxxxxxxxx>
> wrote: The idea is, if you turn this boolean off, no domains will
> be allowed to sys_ptrace or ptrace.
> 
> In doing this, I have noticed that the simplest ps -eZ command 
> generates an access violation.
> 
> allow sysadm_t self:capability sys_ptrace;
> 
> 
> # ps PID TTY          TIME CMD 2123 pts/1    00:00:00 sudo 2127
> pts/1    00:00:05 sh 4095 pts/1    00:00:00 ps sh-4.2# aud
> 
> 
> #============= sysadm_t ============== allow sysadm_t
> self:capability sys_ptrace;
> 
> To me this looks like we are being too strict on the sys_ptrace 
> cabability checking, which I believe is a bug in the kernel.
> 
> 
> If I go into /proc/PID directory of domain with a different UID, I
> get the following, permission denieds:
> 
> cat: auxv: Permission denied cat: cwd: Permission denied cat:
> environ: Permission denied cat: exe: Permission denied cat: io:
> Permission denied cat: maps: Permission denied cat: numa_maps:
> Permission denied cat: pagemap: Permission denied cat: root:
> Permission denied cat: smaps: Permission denied cat: cwd:
> Permission denied
> 
> Are all these really needed?  Is knowing a processes current
> working directory the same as executing
> 
> gdb -p PID
> 
> 
> ???
> 
>> 
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> 
> 
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> 

Grepping through fedora policy I see 21 domains with dontaudit
capability sys_ptrace and another 41 with allow rules.

Seems to me most of these could be eliminated if we just allowed ps -e
to work without generating an AVC.
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