Re: [refpolicy] pam_selinux(gdm-password:session): Security Context justin:staff_r:insmod_t:s0 Assigned

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On Fri, Sep 23, 2011 at 3:09 PM, Guido Trentalancia
<guido@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Fri, 2011-09-23 at 13:38 -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote:

> Yes, very good. At the end, a very polite message is not the first
> priority in such as situation...
>
> But unfortunately this is not the case for the upstream bits.
>
> Ideally should be tackled in the SELinux kernel code. Did RHEL and
> Fedora patch the kernel then to achieve that ?

No we consider init to be part of the trusted base required to load
policy.  The Fedora init (systemd not, but it's been old init, some
scripts in the initramfs, and who know what else) tries to load policy
and if it can't and it was supposed to be enforcing will either print
and error and halt for a really long time and then exit, or exit
directly.  init exiting is enough to make the kernel panic and thus
shut down the box.

The tool that is trusted to load the policy is what needs to make this check.

-Eric

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