Re: is "type poisoning" possible?

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I think for this type of solution u should have a look at SELinux policy changin concepts. It supports migrating processes to different security levels depending on accessing different labeled files.

On Mon, Jul 18, 2011 at 4:15 PM, Zoltan Arnold NAGY <zoltan.arnold.nagy@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Hi,

I apologize in advance if my use of nomenclature is a bit sloppy. I'm
new to this. :)

Let's say I have a process with type P, but it needs a config file.

Is there a way to specify that if P accesses any file having a type Q, then
the process type should transition to T?

This would allow to mitigate attacks where specific config changes are allowed
(but are always coupled with a relabeling to type Q), but we don't
trust the changer.
A side question would be how to force this relabeling to take place
automatically?

Thanks,
Zoltan

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