Re: login process unable to execute /bin/sh

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On Tue, 2011-06-28 at 15:06 -0700, Sam Gandhi wrote:
> Hello Russell,
> 
> On Tue, Jun 28, 2011 at 6:29 AM, Russell Coker <russell@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On Tue, 28 Jun 2011, Sam Gandhi <samgandhi9@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> > Perhaps, you should try adding the other rule ?
> >> >
> >> > allow initrc_t local_login_t:process transition;
> >
> > Why would that be desirable?  /bin/login is generally run from getty which is
> > run from init.  Do we have a need for scripts under /etc/init.d/ to run
> > /bin/login?
> 
> I have fixed this. Now getty runs in getty_t and login is in local_login_t
> 
>   611 system_u:system_r:getty_t          S    /bin/busybox /sbin/getty
> -L 115200
>   594 system_u:system_r:local_login_t  S    login -- root
> 
> >
> >> Jan  1 10:00:37 192.168.137.1 kernel: type=1400 audit(37.230:44): avc:
> >>  granted  { transition } for  pid=600 comm="getty" path="/bin/login"
> >> dev=ubifs ino=99 scontext=system_u:system_r:initrc_t
> >> tcontext=system_u:system_r:local_login_t tclass=process
> >>
> >> Am I wrong in assuming that getty is not an issue because audit
> >> message indicates that when getty executed program /bin/login , domain
> >> transition was done successfully to local_login_t
> >
> > Why is getty running in initrc_t?  What label is on the getty executable and
> > what is the context of the program that runs it?
> >
> >> Jan  1 10:00:39 192.168.137.1 kernel: type=1400 audit(39.090:45): avc:
> >>  denied  { transition } for  pid=812 comm="login" path="/bin/sh"
> >> dev=ubifs ino=93 scontext=system_u:system_r:local_login_t
> >> tcontext=root:system_r:initrc_t tclass=process
> >>
> >> One more piece of information I didn't include in previous email was,
> >> /bin/sh is labeled as shell_exec_t and I do see following rules in my
> >> policy.conf.
> >
> > /bin/sh is usually a symlink (labelled as bin_t) and points to something else
> > matching /bin/*sh - which should have shell_exec_t as the type.  Not that it
> > matters in a normal situation.
> 
> In my situation I am using busybox that is compiled with option
> CONFIG_INSTALL_APPLET_SCRIPT_WRAPPERS=y.
> hence /bin/sh  is not a link, but really a script that contains  following line
> 
> #!/bin/busybox
> 
> We decided to use option of CONFIG_INSTALL_APPLET_SCRIPT_WRAPPERS as
> it will allow us to label busybox executables and may not require
> approach you have suggested in your paper
> http://doc.coker.com.au/papers/porting-se-linux-hand-held-devices/
> 
> >
> >> type_transition initrc_t shell_exec_t:process initrc_t;
> >
> > That looks wrong.
> >
> >> allow initrc_t shell_exec_t:file { read { getattr execute } Ballow
> >> initrc_t shell_exec_t:file { read getattr lock execute ioctl };
> >> allow initrc_t shell_exec_t:file entrypoint;
> >>
> >> allow local_login_t shell_exec_t:file { read { getattr execute } };
> >> type_transition local_login_t shell_exec_t:process initrc_t;
> >> allow local_login_t shell_exec_t:file { read { getattr execute } };
> >> allow local_login_t shell_exec_t:file { { read getattr lock execute
> >> ioctl } execute_no_trans };
> >> allow local_login_t shell_exec_t:file entrypoint;
> >>
> >> The best as I understand allow rules, the local_login_t rules above
> >> says, when process running in context local_login_t (login program in
> >> my case) tries to execute program of type shell_exec_t it should be
> >> allowed, and process should transition to context initrc_t (because of
> >> type_transition statement above).
> >>
> >> Still puzzled as to why I keep getting local_login deny message
> >> (help!). I am running the system with  'auditallow domain
> >> domain:process transition;'  and I don't see any other domain
> >> transitions happening when I try to login to my system.
> >
> > You shouldn't have a login session with the domain initrc_t.  You should have
> > the login program tell the kernel which context to use and it should be
> > something with a different domain.  Either the login program should be patched
> > or you should use PAM with pam_selinux.so configured.
> >
> 
> I am using the latest pam_selinux for login and my pam.d/login looks like this:
> 
> session required pam_selinux.so close debug verbose
> session required pam_selinux.so open nottys debug verbose
> auth            sufficient      pam_unix.so shadow audit use_authtok
> auth           required        pam_deny.so
> account         required        pam_unix.so shadow audit use_authtok
> 
> In spite all of this I was still getting that AVC deny message from login_t
> 
> type=1400 audit(39.090:45): avc: denied  { transition } for  pid=812
> comm="login" path="/bin/sh" dev=ubifs ino=93
> scontext=system_u:system_r:local_login_t
> tcontext=root:system_r:initrc_t tclass=process
> 
> The problem turned out to be the constraints and I have fixed the
> problem by having following in my constraints file (originally I
> didn't have t1 == can_change_process_identity )
> 
> Now my process transition constrains look like this:
> 
> constrain process transition
>         ( u1 == u2 or t1 == privuser or t1 == can_change_process_identity );
> constrain process transition
>         ( r1 == r2 or t1 == privrole );
> constrain process dyntransition
>         ( u1 == u2 and r1 == r2);
> 
> And I have set attribute can_change_process_identity on local_login_t
> 
> typeattribute local_login_t can_change_process_identity;
> 
> Now when users login things are transitioning properly, but this kind
> of sounds bit hack-ish? But I looked at monolithic policy that is
> generated as part of  "reference policy" and it seems to set lot of
> other flags on login_t so I suppose its right thing to do?

Or you could have just added the privuser type attribute to
local_login_t instead of changing the constraint.

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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