Re: Generating policy for embedded platforms.

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On Thu, 2011-04-14 at 11:06 -0700, Sam Gandhi wrote:
> I removed all the allow statements in the policy.conf generated by mdp
> and left just one allow statement
> 
> allow base_t base_t:user73 *;
> 
> Now see the AVC messages as my daemons start, will convert them to
> policy statement using audi2allow. Is this the right approach in
> generating minimal policy for embedded platforms?

That will just generate a policy with all processes running in base_t
and all files labeled with base_t; audit2allow doesn't generate new
types for you.  You need to give some thought to that your security
goals are, what subjects and objects you want to distinguish, define
types and type transitions for those subjects and objects, and label the
subject executables and objects accordingly.  Only then can you begin to
exercise the system and "learn" policy using audit2allow.  You can of
course do this incrementally, e.g. start by splitting out some small set
of subject types (aka "domains") and some coarse-grained division of
your filesystem into a small number of file types, and refine it over
time.

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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