-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 04/13/2010 10:10 AM, Alan Rouse wrote: >> xdm_t uses /sbin/unix_chkpwd to read the shadow file. >> The pam stack will execute this program if it can not >> read shadow directly. In Fedora and RHEL products we >> now attempt to execute /sbin/unix_chkpwd first and then >> fail over to trying to read the shadow file. > > I discovered this situation when I took some modules generated by audit2allow and added them as a layer inside the reference policy source tarball. The rpmbuild -bb <specfile> command reported a conflict between an allow rule (allow xdm_t shadow_t...) and a neverallow rule (a good thing!) What seems odd to me is that I can load that same module via semodule -i and it doesn't complain -- and access by xdm_t to shadow_t is allowed. Is that correct behavior for semodule -i? > > -- > This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. > If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx with > the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message. > > We are only enforcing neverallow at build time, because of the speed of the compiler. You can turn it on by editing /etc/selinux/semange.conf and turning on expand-check=1 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.14 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iEYEARECAAYFAkvEiwcACgkQrlYvE4MpobNKzgCgtJcuNDca4tQ+06BezbiIdvAI VdsAn1e8LzjG+ZnzT+ckAYCygScnwwGK =RsH6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.