Re: [refpolicy] [RFC PATCH v1] refpol: Add netif, node and peer constraints for MCS based policies

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On Tuesday 06 October 2009 09:20:11 am Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> On Thu, 2009-10-01 at 17:35 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > Adapt the MLS netif, node and peer networking constraints for MCS.  This
> > patch preserves the basic structure of the MLS constraints and converts
> > them to use the MCS model which means the "(( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby
> > h2 ))" constraints are converted to "( h1 dom h2 )".
> 
> These need to be switched to MCS-specific attributes.

[Ooops, forgot to reply-all ...]

Sorry, I saw other MLS attributes being used in the MCS constraints file so I 
thought it was okay ... I'll resend soon.

> > Signed-of-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@xxxxxx>
> > ---
> >
> >  policy/mcs |   36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  1 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/policy/mcs b/policy/mcs
> > index b8dc0d6..0759021 100644
> > --- a/policy/mcs
> > +++ b/policy/mcs
> > @@ -99,6 +99,42 @@ mlsconstrain process { sigkill sigstop }
> >  	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcskillall ));
> >
> >  #
> > +# MCS policy for the network ingress/egress controls
> > +#
> > +
> > +# the netif ingress/egress ops, the ingress permission is a "write"
> > operation +# because the subject in this particular case is the remote
> > domain which is +# writing data out the network interface which is acting
> > as the object +mlsconstrain { netif } { ingress }
> > +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> > +mlsconstrain { netif } { egress }
> > +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
> > +
> > +# the node recvfrom/sendto ops, the recvfrom permission is a "write"
> > operation +# because the subject in this particular case is the remote
> > domain which is +# writing data out the network node which is acting as
> > the object +mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom }
> > +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> > +mlsconstrain { node } { sendto }
> > +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
> > +
> > +# the forward ops, the forward_in permission is a "write" operation
> > because the +# subject in this particular case is the remote domain which
> > is writing data +# to the network with a secmark label, the object in
> > this case
> > +mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_in }
> > +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> > +mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_out }
> > +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> > +
> > +#
> > +# MCS policy for the secmark and peer controls
> > +#
> > +
> > +# the peer/packet recv op
> > +mlsconstrain { peer packet } { recv }
> > +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetread ));
> > +
> > +#
> >  # MCS policy for SELinux-enabled databases
> >  #
> 

-- 
paul moore
linux @ hp

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