On Wednesday 26 August 2009 08:49:14 am Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> On Tue, 2009-08-25 at 17:12 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > Add policy for the new TUN driver access controls which allow policy to
> > control which domains have the ability to create and attach to TUN/TAP
> > devices.
...
> > diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/qemu.if b/policy/modules/apps/qemu.if
> > index d258f1d..ee7e214 100644
> > --- a/policy/modules/apps/qemu.if
> > +++ b/policy/modules/apps/qemu.if
> > @@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ template(`qemu_domain_template',`
> > allow $1_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
> > allow $1_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
> > allow $1_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
> > + allow $1_t self:tun_socket create;
> >
> > manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, $1_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t)
> > manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t)
> > @@ -164,6 +165,8 @@ template(`qemu_domain_template',`
> > corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node($1_t)
> > corenet_tcp_bind_vnc_port($1_t)
> > corenet_rw_tun_tap_dev($1_t)
> > + virt_tun_attach($1_t)
> > + userdom_tun_attach($1_t)
>
> These should be moved to be with the other virt and userdom calls.
Fair enough.
> > diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/uml.te b/policy/modules/apps/uml.te
> > index 05e871c..902c226 100644
> > --- a/policy/modules/apps/uml.te
> > +++ b/policy/modules/apps/uml.te
> > @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ allow uml_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
> > # Use the network.
> > allow uml_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
> > allow uml_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
> > +allow uml_t self:tun_socket create;
> > # for mconsole
> > allow uml_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
> >
> > @@ -111,6 +112,8 @@ corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(uml_t)
> > corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(uml_t)
> > corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(uml_t)
> > corenet_rw_tun_tap_dev(uml_t)
> > +virt_tun_attach(uml_t)
> > +userdom_tun_attach(uml_t)
>
> Same thing about moving these, as above.
Done.
> > diff --git a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
> > b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if index 49ac3fd..22a952c 100644
> > --- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
> > +++ b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
> > @@ -1042,6 +1042,7 @@ template(`userdom_unpriv_user_template', `
> > #
> > template(`userdom_admin_user_template',`
> > gen_require(`
> > + attribute admin_tun_type;
> > class passwd { passwd chfn chsh rootok };
> > ')
> >
> > @@ -1077,6 +1078,9 @@ template(`userdom_admin_user_template',`
> >
> > allow $1_t self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg_readpriv;
> >
> > + allow $1_t self:tun_socket create;
> > + typeattribute $1_t admin_tun_type;
> > +
> > kernel_read_software_raid_state($1_t)
> > kernel_getattr_core_if($1_t)
> > kernel_getattr_message_if($1_t)
> > @@ -3027,3 +3031,22 @@ interface(`userdom_dbus_send_all_users',`
> >
> > allow $1 userdomain:dbus send_msg;
> > ')
> > +
> > +########################################
> > +## <summary>
> > +## Allow domain to attach to admin created TUN devices
> > +## </summary>
> > +## <param name="domain">
> > +## <summary>
> > +## Domain allowed access.
> > +## </summary>
> > +## </param>
> > +#
> > +interface(`userdom_tun_attach',`
> > + gen_require(`
> > + attribute admin_tun_type;
> > + ')
> > +
> > + allow $1 admin_tun_type:tun_socket relabelfrom;
> > + allow $1 self:tun_socket relabelto;
> > +')
>
> Why are only admin roles allowed to create tun_sockets? Either the
> interface name should be changed to reflect that its not all user
> domains, or it should be expanded to cover all user domains.
Considering the nature of TUN/TAP devices and the fact that you must have
CAP_NET_ADMIN to create a new device it seemed reasonable to restrict the
tun_socket/create permission to admin roles. However, we do want to allow
non-admin roles the ability to attach (tun_socket/relabel{from,to}
permissions) to existing persistent TUN/TAP devices - this is why the
interface above does not have "admin" anywhere in the name.
Does that make sense?
> > diff --git a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
> > b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te index 48e9070..aff080b 100644
> > --- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
> > +++ b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
> > @@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ attribute unpriv_userdomain;
> > attribute untrusted_content_type;
> > attribute untrusted_content_tmp_type;
> >
> > +attribute admin_tun_type;
> > +
> > type user_home_dir_t alias { staff_home_dir_t sysadm_home_dir_t
> > secadm_home_dir_t auditadm_home_dir_t unconfined_home_dir_t };
> > fs_associate_tmpfs(user_home_dir_t)
> > files_type(user_home_dir_t)
> > diff --git a/policy/modules/system/xen.te b/policy/modules/system/xen.te
> > index 40410a7..6c4b06d 100644
> > --- a/policy/modules/system/xen.te
> > +++ b/policy/modules/system/xen.te
> > @@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ allow xend_t self:unix_dgram_socket
> > create_socket_perms; allow xend_t self:netlink_route_socket
> > r_netlink_socket_perms;
> > allow xend_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
> > allow xend_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms;
> > +allow xend_t self:tun_socket create;
> >
> > allow xend_t xen_image_t:dir list_dir_perms;
> > manage_dirs_pattern(xend_t, xen_image_t, xen_image_t)
>
> No attach?
I'm not a Xen expert, but I assumed from discussions with some virtualization
folks that if you are running Xen then the xend_t domain would handle the
creation of any TUN/TAP devices it may need, hence no need to attach to an
existing TUN/TAP device created by another domain. Yes? No?
--
paul moore
linux @ hp
--
This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list.
If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx with
the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
