KaiGai Kohei wrote:
I am referring to things like:
mlsconstrain { db_tuple } { use select }
(( l1 dom l2 ) or
(( t1 == mlsdbreadtoclr ) and ( h1 dom l2 )) or
( t1 == mlsdbread ) or
( t2 == mlstrustedobject ));
I noticed the db_xxx:{use} permission remained here. :-)
The example I used above is from an older version of the reference
policy.
where t1 == mlsdbread seems to imply an object is trusted to read
strictly dominating objects. Unless I am missing the meaning here, I
would call this a MAC override. I realize there is no concept of a TE
override, but MLS is part of MAC, no? And, this violates B&L rules. This
is something we would control with a Security Administrator "role". Or,
is this mlsdbread something that is impossible to give to a domain in a
DBMS policy?
It is different from my usage of terms.
Some of domains are allowed to access the tuple, and others are
disallowed as the result of access controls using the security
policy.
I understood the term of "MAC override" to express what actions
are allowed without any checks based on security policy, as if
root stuff can ignore DAC checks.
Ya, definitions, definitions :-) Coming from an MLS world, MAC override
meant superseding the B&L policy. In a general sense we use special
authorizations for that (our Security Admin role), while SELinux has a
built in mechanism (mlsdbread)
Thanks,
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