Hi Paul, Is there any reason we can't utilize the new interfaces to handle the unlabeled_t lines in the constraints? I'm not a real big fan of putting direct types into the constraints. -Chad > -----Original Message----- > From: refpolicy-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx > [mailto:refpolicy-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Paul Moore > Sent: Friday, February 20, 2009 4:03 PM > To: selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxx; refpolicy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx > Subject: [refpolicy] [PATCH v2] refpolicy: Add missing > network related MLSconstraints > > Add MLS constraints for several network related access > controls including the new ingress/egress controls and the > older Secmark controls. Based on the following post to the > SELinux Reference Policy mailing list: > > * http://oss.tresys.com/pipermail/refpolicy/2009-February/000579.html > > Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@xxxxxx> > > --- > policy/mls | 45 > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > policy/modules/kernel/mls.if | 42 > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > policy/modules/kernel/mls.te | 2 + > 3 files changed, 89 insertions(+) > > Index: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/mls > =================================================================== > --- refpolicy_svn_repo.orig/policy/mls > +++ refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/mls > @@ -295,8 +295,53 @@ mlsconstrain { netif node } { tcp_send u > # these access vectors have no MLS restrictions # node enforce_dest > > +# > +# MLS policy for the network ingress/egress controls # > + > +# the netif ingress/egress ops, the ingress permission is a "write" > +operation # because the subject in this particular case is > the remote > +domain which is # writing data out the network interface which is > +acting as the object mlsconstrain { netif } { ingress } > + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or > + ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or > + ( t1 == unlabeled_t )); > +mlsconstrain { netif } { egress } > + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or > + ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound )); > > +# the node recvfrom/sendto ops, the recvfrom permission is a "write" > +operation # because the subject in this particular case is > the remote > +domain which is # writing data out the network node which is > acting as > +the object mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom } > + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or > + ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or > + ( t1 == unlabeled_t )); > +mlsconstrain { node } { sendto } > + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or > + ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound )); > > +# the forward ops, the forward_in permission is a "write" operation > +because the # subject in this particular case is the remote domain > +which is writing data # to the network with a secmark label, > the object > +in this case mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_in } > + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or > + ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or > + ( t1 == unlabeled_t )); > +mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_out } > + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or > + ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ) or > + ( t1 == unlabeled_t )); > + > +# > +# MLS policy for the secmark and peer controls # > + > +# the peer/packet recv op > +mlsconstrain { peer packet } { recv } > + (( l1 dom l2 ) or > + (( t1 == mlsnetreadtoclr ) and ( h1 dom l2 )) or > + ( t1 == mlsnetread )); > > # > # MLS policy for the process class > Index: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/modules/kernel/mls.if > =================================================================== > --- refpolicy_svn_repo.orig/policy/modules/kernel/mls.if > +++ refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/modules/kernel/mls.if > @@ -332,6 +332,48 @@ interface(`mls_net_write_within_range',` > > ######################################## > ## <summary> > +## Make specified domain trusted to > +## write inbound packets regardless of the > +## network's or node's MLS range. > +## </summary> > +## <param name="domain"> > +## <summary> > +## Domain allowed access. > +## </summary> > +## </param> > +## <rolecap/> > +# > +interface(`mls_net_inbound_all_levels',` > + gen_require(` > + attribute mlsnetinbound; > + ') > + > + typeattribute $1 mlsnetinbound; > +') > + > +######################################## > +## <summary> > +## Make specified domain trusted to > +## write outbound packets regardless of the > +## network's or node's MLS range. > +## </summary> > +## <param name="domain"> > +## <summary> > +## Domain allowed access. > +## </summary> > +## </param> > +## <rolecap/> > +# > +interface(`mls_net_outbound_all_levels',` > + gen_require(` > + attribute mlsnetoutbound; > + ') > + > + typeattribute $1 mlsnetoutbound; > +') > + > +######################################## > +## <summary> > ## Make specified domain MLS trusted > ## for reading from System V IPC objects > ## up to its clearance. > Index: refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/modules/kernel/mls.te > =================================================================== > --- refpolicy_svn_repo.orig/policy/modules/kernel/mls.te > +++ refpolicy_svn_repo/policy/modules/kernel/mls.te > @@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ attribute mlsnetwriteranged; attribute > mlsnetupgrade; attribute mlsnetdowngrade; attribute mlsnetrecvall; > +attribute mlsnetinbound; > +attribute mlsnetoutbound; > > attribute mlsipcread; > attribute mlsipcreadtoclr; > > -- > paul moore > linux @ hp > > _______________________________________________ > refpolicy mailing list > refpolicy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx > http://oss.tresys.com/mailman/listinfo/refpolicy > -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. 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