Daniel J Walsh wrote:
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Joshua Brindle wrote:
Daniel J Walsh wrote:
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Joshua Brindle wrote:
Daniel J Walsh wrote:
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Joshua Brindle wrote:
Daniel J Walsh wrote:
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Policy should label /root with one label and this should not be
effected
by the passwd database.
In Fedora policy we label this as admin_home_t. Having this label
vary
depending on policy ends up with lines like
dontaudit * user_home_t:dir search_dir_perms
dontaudit * admin_home_t:dir search_dir_perms
dontaudit * sysadmin_home_t:dir search_dir_perms
dontaudit * staff_home_t:dir search_dir_perms
Labeling this directory as user_home_t, opens the system to possible
security risks since some domains have to be able to write to
user_home_t when they would never be allowed to write to
admin_home_t.
The comment right above the added lines seems to indicate that was
suppose to be root before, why is / excluded? Are we going to start a
huge whitelist for genhomedircon?
if (strcmp(pwent->pw_dir, "/") == 0) {
/* don't relabel / genhomdircon checked to see
if root
* was the user and if so, set his home
directory to
* /root */
continue;
}
No just /root
/root should not be labeled based on genhomedircon.
Why are the exact same lines there for "/" then?
Well I guess we do want to protect / and /root.
Others should be fixed by looking at the parent, so if I added /var as a
homedir it would blow up saying it conflicts with the previous
definition of /var.
I don't think I understand the problem we are trying to solve here...
Right now we do not know what /root is going to be labeled.
Sometime it is labeled admin_home_t sometimes sysadm_home_dir_t other
times user_home_dir_t.
I believe this is wrong. It is not a "USER" home dir, it is something
far more special.
Allowing it to be set by an application like genhomedircon, prevents us
from knowing what the label should be.
Chris and I talked about this and we both think the same thing, genhomedircon is
not in the business of knowing who is and is not an administrative user,
"special" user, etc. root _is_ a user, and on an SELinux system can be an
unprivileged user.
I think hardcoding in the library the specialness of /root is a bad idea, what
if someone changes roots default role to user_r to make it unprivileged? They'd
also need to change the file context entries explicitly with this patch rather
than genhomedircon simply updating the entries.
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