Re: [refpolicy] [PATCH] Add a new permission to db_procedure

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KaiGai Kohei wrote:
> Folks,
> 
> Do you have any opinion, question, approval or opposition for the new
> permission to db_procedure class?
> 
> KaiGai Kohei wrote:
>>> Changes to object classes need to be discussed on the SELinux list.
>> OK, I send the patch again for folks in selinux-list only.
>>
>>>>> The attached patch add a new permission named as "install" to db_procedure.
>>>>>
>>>>> The purpose of this permission is to prevent malicious functions are invoked
>>>>> as a part of server's internal tasks.
>>>>>
>>>>> PostgreSQL allows user-defined functions to use its internal tasks.
>>>>> For example, it can be used to implement an output/input handler of new data
>>>>> types, an index access method, implementation of operator classes and so on.
>>>>>
>>>>> When we defines a new type, it requires to specify its output/input handler
>>>>> at least. No need to say, these functions should not be malicious ones,
>>>>> because user implicitly invokes these function when he uses the type.
>>>>> This permission is checked when we defines a new system catalog entry which
>>>>> has a possibility to invoke user defined functions.
>> A supplement:
>> PostgreSQL allows user to define his own data type, like "struct xxx" in C
>> language, and he can also define its input/output handler. The input/output
>> handler is invoked when user send a text representation, to translate it
>> into internal data structure, implicitly. For example, a function similar
>> to atoi() is configured for INTEGER type in default.
>>
>> I'm worrying about a malicious one secretly installs a malicious function
>> which leaks given information to somewhere as a implementation of type
>> input/output handler, in typical scenario.
>>
>> In addition, it allows to install user-defined functions to implement
>> database index access methods, multibyte encoding conversions, operator
>> classes and so on.
>>
>>>>> In the attached patch, only sepgsql_proc_t is allowed to { install }, because
>>>>> any other user defined functions are not checked by DBA, so it is not safe to
>>>>> use it as a part of internal/common processes.
>>>>> If DBA want to apply user defined functions as a part of internal task, he has
>>>>> to confirm its safeness and relabel to sepgsql_proc_t at first.
>>>>>
>>>>> Please apply it, if no matter.
>> Thanks,
> 

Chris asked me to look at this and it seems reasonable to me, no
objections here.


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