Joshua Brindle wrote:
Justin P. Mattock wrote:
Amon Ott wrote:
Rule Set Based Access Control (RSBAC) 1.4.0 has been released for both
Linux kernels 2.4.37 and 2.6.27.10
You can download the new version from http://www.rsbac.org
RSBAC is one of the leading access control systems for the Linux
kernel with a good selection of access control models, see
http://www.rsbac.org/why for more details.
Important changes since 1.3 series:
* VUM (Virtual User Management) support
(http://rsbac.org/redir.php?t=vum)
* One time password support for user management
(http://rsbac.org/redir.php?t=otp)
* Code for kernels 2.4 and 2.6 has been separated. 2.4 kernels might
be phased out at a later date.
* PAM module does not send a message "User not authenticated" anymore
if authentication failed. (To match other PAM modules behavior)
* Made PAM password prompt standard and definable to RSBAC's custom
prompt if the user wants it only.
* rsbac_useradd -K to copy a user with password.
* rsbac_mount now uses kernel's vfs_mount
About RSBAC 1.4:
---
RSBAC 1.4 mainly introduces the new Virtual User Management feature
( (http://rsbac.org/redir.php?t=vum),
which allows to isolate complete sets of users in so-called "virtual
sets". Every user in every set can have individual passwords and
access rights.
As an example, you can start your mail server in a different set, and
the users getting the email will not be part of the system users.
Likewise, your jails can be started in a different set, so that the
users in that jail will never be the same ones as the real system
users.
You can specify the user set with the usual tools by specifying the
full user path, e.g.:
0/0 defines user id 0 (root) in virtual set 0 (eg system user root)
0/1000 defines user id 1000 in virtual set 0 (eg a system user)
1/secoff defines user secoff in virtual set 1 ( be.g. with uid 400)
2/1000 defines user id 1000 in virtual set 2 (for example, mail users
could be in set 2)
Amon.
alright a new security mechanism!!
RSBAC has been around quite some time actually. It is not SELinux
related and does not use LSM to place its security hooks and therefore
is not viable for the upstream kernel. It is an addon kernel patch.
(still need to learn UBAC though);
UBAC is an SELinux policy, in some ways it demonstrates the
flexibility of the SELinux policy language. RSBAC is a framework for
many security modules (sort of like a heavier-weight LSM). Currently
it doesn't have a module with as expressive a policy language as
SELinux. The only MAC module is a Bell and LaPadula implementation
(though it does have role based access control, access control lists
and others).
Anyways I'll have to give this a shot.
I thought RSBAC was newly created.
didn't know it was as old as SELinux :^)
(I wasn't trying to be rude by adding the CC's,
but now am glad); I'm going to read up
on RSBAC to get a better idea of how it
works.
regards;
Justin P. Mattock
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