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> On Fri, 2008-11-21 at 20:20 +0100, Vince Le Port wrote:
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>> Dear all,
>>
>> I am working on a mean to change the nfs server context depending on the
>> user who wants to access his files. I have planned to use MCS to do that.
>>
>> Here is the approach for NFS:
>>
>> Let us say, we have two users : client1 in s0:c1 and client2 in s0:c2
>> If client1 wants to access his home directory mounted with NFS, then the
>> NFS daemon will change his MCS category corresponding to the client MCS
>> category
>> That will limit the risk that client2 could access client1's files
>>
>> Thus, for example my test program is launched in that context :
>> sysadm_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0:c1.c2
>>
>> Then that program makes a setcon in order to move into
>> sysadm_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0:c1 and the following step is to move the
>> program in that context sysadm_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0:c2
>>
>> I have written the following semodule :
>>
>> module localadmin 1.0;
>>
>> require {
>> type sysadm_t;
>> class process setcurrent;
>> class process dyntransition;
>> }
>>
>> allow sysadm_t self:process { setcurrent dyntransition };
>>
>> The problem is that this setcon does not work. Audit launches a
>> dyntransition permission denied :
>>
>> type=AVC msg=audit(1224660818.891:422): avc: denied { dyntransition }
>> for pid=18334 comm="prog" scontext=sysadm_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0:c2
>> tcontext=sysadm_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0:c1 tclass=process
>>
>> It also seems impossible to return back to the original context s0:c1.c2
>> , once s0:c1 is reached
>>
>> Is it possible to allow this transition?
>>
>> Thanks you for helping a SElinux newbie
>
> The domain needs the mcssetcats attribute in order to pass the MCS
> policy constraints.
>
> You can use the mcs_process_set_categories() refpolicy interface if
> building using the refpolicy infrastructure (i.e. yum install
> selinux-policy-devel, make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile
> localadmin.pp).
>
> I'm not sure what you are really planning to do though, as:
> - obviously your program should not run in sysadm_t,
> - The real processing for nfsd is handled by kernel threads, not a
> userland process, and thus can change its credentials without going
> through permission checks,
> - you still need a mechanism of binding the client process security
> context to the NFS request and conveying that to the server.
>
> You may wish to have a look at the ongoing labeled NFS work:
> http://selinuxproject.org/page/Labeled_NFS
>
Following your advice, I have created a dedicated domain for my app
which now transitions from myapp_exec_t to myapp_t when I execute it. It
seems more relevant than my previous idea.
The use of the interface mcs_process_set_categories() lets the
application change its categories perfectly.
My next step is to work on the mean to convey the user's context to the
server
Thank you for your anwser!
Regards,
Vince
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