On Tue, 2008-09-30 at 10:38 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting Eric Paris (eparis@xxxxxxxxxx): > > On Wed, 2008-10-01 at 00:23 +1000, James Morris wrote: > > > On Tue, 30 Sep 2008, Eric Paris wrote: > > > > > > > This patch adds a WARN_ONCE() to cap_capable() so we will stop > > > > dereferencing random spots of memory and will cleanly tell the obviously > > > > broken driver that it doesn't have that ridiculous permissions. No idea > > > > if the driver is going to handle EPERM but anything that calls capable > > > > and doesn't expect a denial has got to be the worst piece of code ever > > > > written..... I could return EINVAL, but I think its clear that noone > > > > has capabilities over 64 so clearly they don't have that permission. > > > > > > > > This 'could' be considered a regression since 2.6.24. Neither SELinux > > > > nor the capabilities system had a problem with ginormous request values > > > > until we got 64 bit support, although this is OBVIOUSLY a bug with the > > > > out of tree closed source driver.... > > > > > > An issue here is whether we should be adding workarounds in the mainline > > > kernel for buggy closed drivers. Papering over problems rather than > > > getting them fixed does not seem like a winning approach. Especially > > > problems which are unexpectedly messing with kernel security APIs. > > > > I don't know, looking at the feelings on "Can userspace bugs be kernel > > regressions" leads me to believe that when we break something that once > > worked we are supposed to fix it. > > > > http://lwn.net/Articles/292143/ > > > > I don't think the proprietary closed source nature of the driver makes > > it any less our problem > > The kernel-space nature of the driver is the distinction here. > > > to not make changes which cause the kernel to > > esplode. > > > > > Also, won't this encourage vendors of such drivers to continue with this > > > behavior, while discouraging those vendors who are doing the right thing? > > > > Discouraging people who open source their drivers and put them in the > > kernel? obviously not. encouraging crap? well, I hope we fix > > regressions no matter how they are found... > > > > > Do we know if this even really helps the user? For all we know, the > > > driver may simply crash differently with an -EPERM. > > > > Well, before the 64 bit capabilities change we did: > > > > (cap_t(c) & CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) > > > > so a huge value for "flag" got masked off. > > > > After 64 bit capabilities we do: > > > > ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) > > Perhaps we should have CAP_TO_INDEX mask itself? > > #define CAP_TO_INDEX(x) (((x) >> 5) & _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S) Well, you save a branch and won't get the pagefault so it does 'fix' the pagefault/panic from cap code. It doesn't tell us when others screw up and SELinux is still possibly going to BUG(). We are also going to actually be returning a permission decision not on what was requested but on something wholely different. I like mine better, but I'm ok with yours and can just do my changes in SELinux if this is how cap wants to handle it. I don't really like the idea of mutating the inputs and then making the security decision based on that mutation rather than on the original inputs (and yes, I realize that exactly what 2.6.24 was doing) > Though I still think it's not unreasonable to simply ask for the driver > to be fixed. I'm not going to argue that the driver needs fixed and that is the real problem. I know its been filed with them and the response was that there is no support for linux. I have today tried to poke the path I know of between Red Hat and them to ask them to take a look. -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
