KaiGai Kohei wrote:
> Joshua Brindle wrote:
>> KaiGai Kohei wrote:
>>> The attached patch for libsepol add suport for a new policy version
>>> named as (MOD_)POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY.
>>> Userspace hierarchy checks are reworked in this revision.
>>>
>>> FEATURES:
>>>
>>> - Boundary feature support:
>>> The upcoming kernel has a feature to define boundary relationship
>>> between two users, roles and types. It enables to restrict a bounded
>>> one can never have wider permissions than its bounds one.
>>> Any XXXX_datum_t structure have "u32 bounds" member to indicate its
>>> bounds, and we can handle it with the latest version of policy format
>>> provided by this patch.
>>>
>>> - Loading attributes into kernel space:
>>> The upcoming kernel also allows to load entries of attribute.
>>> The attached patch turn off to drop them, when it tries to write
>>> kernel policy with its version is equal or greater than
>>> POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY.
>>> Any entries of attribute has a property of TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_ATTRIBUTE.
>>>
>>> - Improvement of type_datum format on kernel/modular policy.
>>> The type_datum entry has several its attribute fields like "primary",
>>> "flavor" and "flags", and these are stored within separated fields
>>> on-disk format. This patch enables to pack them into a single field.
>>> Currently four bits are defined, and rest of them are reserved.
>>> #define TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_PRIMARY 0x0001
>>> #define TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_ATTRIBUTE 0x0002
>>> #define TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_ALIAS 0x0004 /* userspace only */
>>> #define TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_PERMISSIVE 0x0008 /* userspace only */
>>>
>>> - Hierarchy checks are reworked
>>> The existing userspace hierarchy checks are reworked for the upcoming
>>> boundary feature. It can handle parent one based on both newer bounds
>>> relationship and existing name-based hierarchy.
>>>
>>> In addition, I put a trick to evaluate conditional rules correctly.
>>> The following example shows a confusable case. A_t is the bounds of B_t,
>>> so B_t can never has wider permission than A_t.
>>>
>>> Example)
>>> allow B_t X_t : file { read_file_perms };
>>> if (A_can_write_X) {
>>> allow A_t X_t : file { write_file_perms };
>>> } else {
>>> allow A_t X_t : file { read_file_perms };
>>> }
>>>
>>> A_t's permissions on X_t is depend on the 'A_can_write_X', however,
>>> a part of them, like 'read', are unconditionally allowed.
>>> If we can find common permission on both of true/false lists, these
>>> are pulled up to unconditional rules.
>>> Thus, B_t's read permission on X_t is not hierarchy violated in the
>>> above example. It also matches the upcoming kernel behavior no need
>>> to say.
>>>
>> Was this the latest patch? I can't seem to apply it either to the latest
>> git HEAD or to the last svn revision:
>
> Sorry, my Thunderbird translated any tabs into spaces.
> The patch is made based on the latest subversion repository.
> Can you apply the attached one correctly?
>
Yes it applies. I'm going to have to track down that bug you reported before merging this because it prevents policy compilation.
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