[refpolicy patch] Updated Git daemon domain.

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Attached is my latest take on confining Git daemon. I removed Git user
domain and userdom_git_user_template and added a
git_daemon_git_user_template instead. There is no user domain able to
read or write git_daemon_system_content. One would have to create a user
domain, call git_daemon_git_user_template in it, and since the Git user
domain has to be a primary domain, one would also have a default user
context.

Also note that apache calls git_daemon_read_all_git_content in an
optional policy block. I have tried to wrap this call into a tunable
block first and then into optional policy. Although this did compile, it
did not yield the expected results. This is why i decided to not make
this tunable. It has to optional in my view.

The Git daemon domain is a coarse implementation. Content only has two
general types, system content and user content. Because Git daemon uses
SSH daemon to push content, the system ACLs are transparent. This means
i may be able to implement finer grained access control. For example
which Git user domain may access which Git daemon content?

Attachement: http://pastebin.ca/1093095
-- 
Dominick Grift <domg472@xxxxxxxxx>

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