Re: Patch to make libselinux shut up when SELinux is disabled.

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Daniel J Walsh wrote:
Paul after discussions at the OLS/SELinux mini summit.  Karl MacMillan
had an interesting talk about how we are perhaps going to far with Least
Priv.  And the idea of common security goals came up.  He was talking
about grouping applications with common security constraints into a
greater policy, this would eliminate lots of potential bugs without
decreasing security that greatly.  The best example of this in my
opinion has been our treatment of spam.  We have multiple packages
within Fedora/Debian whose main goals are the prevention of spam email
reaching the user.  Spamassassin, razor, pyzor/spamass-milter probably
more.  Each one of these has a written policy for it and interacts with
the multiple email clients.  These have caused a huge amount of
AVCs/Bugzilla's.  And they all pretty much have the same security
problems.  We want to prevent either a daemon or a user app from reading
untrusted mail and then doing something bad.  So in Rawhide I have
worked to consolodate these policies into two types spamd_t and a
spamc_t policy.   Where the difference is a spam daemon or spam client
application.  Then we can begin collapsing the rules and labeling down
to the directories that all of the similar apps need to use.  Hopefully
this will simplify the policy and eliminate the breakage we currently
have in handling spam.

This is interesting in that the DAC world seems to have been moving in the opposite direction in recent years, such as the split of sendmail into separate daemon (not suid root) and client with 8.12, openssh adding privilege separation in a small helper etc.

Anyway, what I'm doing with spamass-milter probably ties in reasonably well with the Rawhide approach. The milter sits in a sort of middle ground between being a daemon and a client. It's a daemon in that it's directly involved in SMTP processing with the MTA, but as far as spamassassin is concerned, it's a client, calling spamc just like any other client.

The only thing directly spam-related in the spamass-milter policy is the call to the spamassassin_domtrans_spamc() interface, so I'm leveraging the work already done for regular SA usage. All of the other stuff is milter-specific and not generally useful to other spam-attacking applications I think, though there's a lot of commonality with other milter applications, hence the template approach I'm using.

Paul.

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