Re: [PATCH] libselinux: add support for /contexts/postgresql_contexts

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Chris PeBenito wrote:
> On Thu, 2008-06-05 at 10:18 +0900, KaiGai Kohei wrote:
>> Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
>>> On Wed, 2008-06-04 at 13:03 +0900, KaiGai Kohei wrote:
>>>> Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
>>>>> On Tue, 2008-06-03 at 19:25 +0900, KaiGai Kohei wrote:
>>>>>> Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
>>>>>>> I'm out of arguments; clearly I'm in the minority on this issue.  I
>>>>>>> already said I wouldn't block the policy over this, so KaiGai, if you
>>>>>>> would send a last patch based on the revisions I made [1], let see if we
>>>>>>> can finally get this merged.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> [1] http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=120999566809541&w=2
>>>>>> I'll submit a revised version later.
>>>>>> (Now we cannot update SVN repository, due to server maintenance.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Before this, I want to modify the following points:
> 
>>>> Then, the above dontaudit rule should be rewritten as follows:
>>>>
>>>>   dontaudit { sepgsql_client_type sepgsql_unpriv_type postgresql_t } \
>>>>             { sepgsql_table_type - sepgsql_sysobj_table_type } : db_tuple *;
>>>>
>>>> At first, I used a boolean (sepgsql_enable_audittuple) to turn on/off
>>>> tuple-level access logs, but you suggested it is unnecessary, so I removed it.
>>> I don't agree because of:
>>>
>>> +allow postgresql_t sepgsql_table_type:{ db_table db_column db_tuple } *;
>>> +allow sepgsql_unconfined_type sepgsql_table_type:{ db_table db_column db_tuple } *;
>>>
>>> so dontauditing for postgresql_t and sepgsql_unconfined_type doesn't do
>>> anything since the access is allowed.
>> It is correct in type enforcement.
>> But MCS/MLS can prevent to access by unconfined domains, and make flood of
>> access denied logs.
> 
> Ok, I see your point.  Please add a comment in the policy that explains
> this, so I don't mistakenly remove the dontaudit in the future :)
> 
> One thing I just realized: do we really want to dontaudit all perms?  It
> seems like use and/or select might be sufficient.  Dontauditing
> relabelto and relabelfrom doesn't seem like a good idea.

OK, I'll send the patch with a comment for tuple-level dontaudit and
without dontaudit for relabelfrom/relabelto.

Please wait for days.

Thanks,
-- 
OSS Platform Development Division, NEC
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

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