Re: refpolicy roles / RBAC separation RFC

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On Wed, 2008-04-30 at 08:18 -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
> If I want to run a confined role say webadm_r, I would not allow
> webadm_r to touch any files in /root, so I don't see that I need
> protection.  Similarly webadm_r can not touch entries in the Homedir so
> it can not attack other roles.  If you need to create an admin role
> which administrates more then one confined domain, then you would
> generate a new admin role or enhance an existing admin role.  For
> example if you want to allow the webadm_r:webadm_t to be able to admin
> mysql,  you simply create a policy module with
> 
> mysql_admin(webadm_t, webadm_r, { webadm_devpts_t webadm_tty_device_t })

Just noticed this - is the plan to retain the derived types for
ttys/ptys, or are those also going away as part of this elimination of
per-role types?

If you retain the derived types on ttys/ptys, then I'm not sure how you
eliminate the per-role program domains, as one of the reasons for them
to exist is to preserve isolation of the ttys/ptys.

> Or you create a brand new admin module with
> 
> policy_module(myadm, 1.0)
> 
> userdom_base_user_template(myadm)
> allow myadm_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search kill
> sys_ptrace sys_nice };
> 
> apache_admin(myadm_t, myadm_r,  { myadm_devpts_t myadm_tty_device_t })
> mysql_admin(myadm_t, myadm_r,  { myadm_devpts_t myadm_tty_device_t })
> 
> gen_require(`
>         type staff_t;
> ')
> allow staff_t myadm_t:process transition;
> allow myadm_t staff_t:dir getattr;
> 
> 
> We need to keep it this simple, or only Consultants will ever be able to
> use this stuff.
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-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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