Re: [PATCH] SE-PostgreSQL Security Policy

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Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
On Wed, 2008-02-27 at 17:00 +0900, Kohei KaiGai wrote:
The attached patch provides security policies related to
SE-PostgreSQL.

The followings are updates/unchanges from the previous version
submitted
at two weeks ago. These updates replaced most of the part in the
previous
one.

- The targets of this patch are moved to services/postgresql.*,
   although the previous one added new entries.

+tunable_policy(`sepgsql_enable_auditallow',`
+       auditallow domain sepgsql_database_type  : db_database all_db_database_perms;
+       auditallow domain sepgsql_table_type     : db_table all_db_table_perms;
+       auditallow domain sepgsql_table_type     : db_column all_db_column_perms;
+       auditallow domain sepgsql_procedure_type : db_procedure all_db_procedure_perms;
+       auditallow domain sepgsql_blob_type      : db_blob all_db_blob_perms;
+       auditallow domain sepgsql_server_type    : db_blob { import export };
+       auditallow domain sepgsql_module_type    : db_database { install_module };
+')


A couple questions about the install_module and load_module permissions. First they seem here to be refering to sepgsql_module_type as the object which currently are lib_t and textrel_shlib_t, file types. So the object class of db_database seems to be inaccurate.

Also, after looking at the code I don't see why install_module and load_module need to be different permissions, granted they are a privileged operation but why not collapse them into a single access vector?

Also, why are blobs a separate object class? How is it a privileged operation to use blobs in a table? As far as reading and writing them they should be treated like any other column, shouldn't they?

And one more question. I see you have a type transition for sepgsql_proc_t but I never saw sepgsql_proc_t as the subject of any rules, which I don't understand. The hooks appear to always use the client_sid as the subject but for stored procedures to be useful they may need to access data that the client wouldn't be able to, or did I miss something?


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